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ARTICLES & ESSAYS 
THE EQUILIBRIUM CONTENT OF CORPORATE 
FEDERALISM 
William W. Bratton* and Joseph A. McCahery** 
INTRODUCTION 
This is a time of spirited debate about the state-federal 
allocation of corporate regulation.  Arguments about the legitimacy 
of charter competition and Delaware’s national role as a corporate 
lawmaker are as intense as ever.  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 1 
simultaneously has triggered a loud discussion about the legitimacy 
of federal intervention into corporate internal affairs traditionally 
regulated by the states.  We, however, see no cause for excitement 
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 1. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified 
in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C. (Supp. II 2002)). 
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on either front.  Despite recent evidence of infirmities in the charter 
market, we think Delaware legitimately plays a national role.  At 
the same time, we see no support for the view that recent federal 
expansion into internal affairs territory destabilizes or impairs 
corporate law’s federal structure. 
This Article explains why corporate federalism remains robust, 
offering a positive political economy.  Drawing on the history of 
corporate law and basic concepts of evolutionary game theory, we 
locate the content of corporate federalism in two stable equilibriums.  
The first equilibrium prevails in the charter market, following from 
Delaware’s successful pursuit of an evolutionarily stable strategy to 
maximize rents from the sale of charters.  The strategy, first 
followed by New Jersey, caused a radical change in corporate law in 
the late nineteenth century.  Since then, stability has ruled.  
Corporate law’s basic, enabling outline changed little during the 
twentieth century.  Operative incentives, market structure, and 
regulatory results have been more constant than dynamic, even as 
Delaware often has adjusted its strategy as it has adapted to events. 
The second equilibrium is more political than economic and 
prevails among the makers of national corporate law—Congress, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, the stock exchanges, and the 
federal courts.  These actors react to events in a more volatile 
manner.  But even here equilibrium has prevailed since 1934.  In 
theory, under the prevailing norm, national regulation covers the 
securities markets and mandates transparency respecting firms 
with publicly traded securities, while internal corporate affairs are 
left to the states.  In practice, federal lawmakers sometimes 
disregard the norm, entering into internal affairs as the national 
system grows episodically.  But they follow a norm of cooperation 
even as they make these incursions.  Federal regulators never 
structure interventions so as to disrupt the state equilibrium.  They 
leave Delaware in place, along with its stable strategy and its rents.  
In our view, this is the core of federalism, a view that contrasts with 
a prevailing subject matter-based conception. 
The cooperative federal strategy gradually evolved toward 
stability after 1934.  Federal regulatory restraint was politically 
contested for much of the twentieth century, as progressives 
objected to rent-driven lawmaking in the states and proposed 
preemption of the entire field.  But the public interest approach 
steadily lost political salience.  On the other side, beginning in the 
latter part of the century, free market proponents made a case 
against any national corporate law, in effect proposing an 
irrebuttable presumption favoring state regulation of internal 
affairs.  That case also has lacked political salience.  The actors who 
make corporate law have resisted the influence of both ideological 
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paradigms, instead regulating by reference to a governance agenda.  
This is a set of regulatory strategies, mostly process-based, directed 
to the amelioration of agency costs in publicly traded, management-
dominated firms.  Discussions of agenda items tend to devolve on 
functional questions about performance and welfare effects.  
Ideological lines tend to be drawn only when questions arise as to 
the relative costs and benefits of self-regulation and process 
mandates.  Since answers tend to be cautious, they by default favor 
state autonomy.  At the same time, the internal affairs presumption 
yields quickly whenever a national political imperative presents 
itself. 
In the evolving pattern, the federal system mandates while 
Delaware consistently favors self-regulation.  The federal 
government is the bad cop.  Its mission is to make sure that firms 
tell the truth about themselves.  It performs the mission with a 
massive, mandatory apparatus peopled by prosecutors with political 
aspirations and greedy plaintiffs ’  lawyers, imposing fines and 
large money judgments and occasionally sending miscreants to jail.  
Delaware is the good cop.  It arbitrates between shareholder and 
management interests, making sure never to chill risk taking.  It 
articulates governance standards in a dialogue with the actors it 
regulates.  It only polices when forced.  Even then it chooses its 
techniques with care, sometimes enjoining a transaction but almost 
never imposing a money judgment.  Its mandarin corporate case law 
is conversant with financial technicalities and full of procedural 
nuance. 
The good cop/bad cop routine follows from the federal structure.  
Delaware’s sales of domiciles to firms operating nationwide can 
implicate externalities.  Externalities do occur because Delaware’s 
strategy structurally favors management on allocational questions.  
It follows that a state with Delaware’s incentives would not be 
tolerated as a de facto national lawmaker absent the possibility of 
federal preemption to reverse or modify state law results.  At the 
same time, when financial crises and compliance breakdowns 
coincide, 2  national lawmakers worry about the reactions of the 
median voter.  There result national political demands concerning 
the conduct of corporate business.  Delaware is disabled from 
responding to such demands, self-regulation and kid glove 
treatment being essential components of its evolutionarily stable 
strategy.  Charter competition embeds enabling state corporate law 
 
 2. Price declines have been triggering governmental regulation of the 
securities markets for 300 years.  See STUART BANNER, ANGLO-AMERICAN 
SECURITIES REGULATION: CULTURAL AND POLITICAL ROOTS 1690-1860 41 (1998). 
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and inhibits policing.  By default, then, the job of confronting 
external shocks goes to actors at the national level.  This leaves 
Delaware structurally vulnerable to shifting preferences and abrupt 
changes in response at the federal level. 
But federal responses have, over time, become progressively less 
threatening to the state equilibrium.  Federal elected officials tend 
to traverse internal affairs on the upside to satisfy interest group 
demands, expecting no adverse political consequences.  On the 
downside, officials legislate in response to more broadly based 
political demands, acting to avoid finding themselves on the wrong 
side of median voter preferences, rather than acting at the behest of 
the interest groups.  Meanwhile, median voter demands have moved 
away from early- and mid-twentieth century populist concerns like 
corporate bigness and labor relations.  Now, in the era of 
shareholder capitalism, national political demands tend to be driven 
by shareholder value.  Today’s populist agenda concerns compliance 
with laws designed to assure accurate market prices. 
These downside legislative packages are designed to correct 
policy imbalances in the voters’ eyes and avoid any fundamental 
restructuring of corporate law.  This makes political sense in light of 
Delaware’s emergence in the good cop role.  Just as the good cop’s 
role is untenable without a bad cop in the other room, so does the 
bad cop make use of the good cop.  As the good cop, Delaware figures 
in the wider politics of shareholder value.  It follows that 
interference with the state equilibrium implies more than just 
interest group opposition; it also holds out political risks with the 
median voter. 
Where national corporate law is driven by valuations in 
securities markets, state corporate law is driven by rents.  Many 
take this point as a basis for questioning the system, persuasively 
showing that the state equilibrium does not measure up as first-best 
when analogized to an efficient product market.  While we agree 
with the second-best description of the charter market, we do not see 
any negative implications for Delaware’s legitimacy, in theory or in 
practice.  For us, it suffices that the system is consensual, 
responsive, and monitored at the national level.  Indeed, it is not 
clear to us that a first-best market for law could exist in the first 
place.  Law rarely works as product in the real world because 
lawmakers lack entrepreneurial incentives.  It accordingly is 
unsurprising to find a jackpot of rents in the financial profile of a 
state that not only turns itself into an entrepreneurial shop, but also 
successfully pursues the same business plan for a century. 
Summing up, this Article brings five points to corporate 
federalism discussions.  First, federal intervention into internal 
affairs is inevitable because Delaware follows an evolutionarily 
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stable strategy that constrains its ability to respond to shocks that 
create national political demands.  Second, national interventions 
are structured so as to leave the rent-driven state equilibrium 
undisturbed.  Third, the cooperative federal strategy has come to 
respond to political demands focused on shareholder value.  Fourth, 
the state equilibrium’s second-best quality has no bearing on 
corporate federalism.  From all of this follows a fifth point—the 
threat of federal intervention has sunk into the deep constitutional 
structure, leaving Delaware safe in the present context. 
Part I recounts the evolution of state corporate codes from the 
appearance of charter competition in New Jersey in 1888 through 
the takeover wars of the 1980s.  This account shows that an 
enabling approach quickly became embedded in corporate law due to 
the appearance of a stable strategy for charter market success.  The 
discussion goes on to describe the opposing evaluative models drawn 
on by the charter system’s opponents and proponents—the trust 
paradigm of Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means3 (and successors) and 
the market paradigm of Henry Manne and Michael Jensen4 (and 
successors).  Finally, Part I takes up the question of whether the 
charter market’s second-best properties make any difference for 
federalism and the internal affairs norm, concluding that they do 
not matter. 
Part II turns to national law, setting out a political economy of 
federal incursions on corporate internal affairs since 1934.  This 
begins with two prominent initiatives that failed, federal chartering 
and federal protection of hostile takeovers, and shows how both the 
trust and market paradigms both fell short as political motivators.  
Discussion turns to incursions that succeeded, mostly prominently 
the Williams Act, 5  the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 6  and the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.7  These histories show that where the state 
system is embedded, federal corporate lawmaking is politically 
contingent and responsive to events.  Even so, federal regulators 
respond to events in predictable ways, hewing to the governance 
agenda, the shareholder value enhancement objective, and a 
 
 3. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY (rev. ed. 1991). 
 4. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 
305, 310 (1976). 
 5. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-
(e), 78n(d)-(f) (2000)). 
 6. Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 
13(b)(2), 30A, 32, 78m(b)(2), 78dd-1-2, 78ff (2000)). 
 7. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 
15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C. (Supp. II 2002)). 
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cooperative pattern of respect for the stable state equilibrium. 
Part III focuses on state responses to developments in the 
national political economy, looking at Delaware’s evolution since the 
mid-1970s.  Delaware, under national pressure, adjusted its 
strategy to make itself a more credible source of corporate fiduciary 
law.  It learned how to draw on the governance agenda to build self 
regulation into fiduciary enforcement.  It emerged in the role of 
national good cop, the important point being that it found a way to 
police without defecting from its equilibrium strategy.  Delaware 
also held to its strategy on the focal point issue of antitakeover 
protection in the teeth of federal pressure.  Today, with takeovers off 
of the federal political agenda and newly empowered shareholders 
taking up governance slack, Delaware looks to be in better shape 
than ever. 
Part IV concludes. 
I. POLITICAL ECONOMY AT THE STATE LEVEL 
National regulators—Congress, the Securities Exchange 
Commission, the stock exchanges, and the federal courts—have 
generated a long list of disclosure8 and governance mandates that 
expand on the state corporate law system, imposing additional 
duties on corporate managers and according shareholders additional 
rights.  These national regulations tend to supplement the state 
system, rarely displacing it altogether.9  The pattern of restraint 
does not follow from a constitutional mandate—Congress could draw 
on the same Commerce Clause10 on which it draws in supplementing 
the state system to occupy the entire field of corporate law.  The 
restraint instead follows from an informal norm of federalism, 
termed “internal affairs.”  This abstracts from the post-1934 
regulatory pattern to hold that federal law appropriately addresses 
trading markets, adding disclosure, antifraud, and insider trading 
mandates.  All other corporate subject matters concern “internal 
 
 8. The disclosure mandates significantly impact day-to-day conduct of 
business, despite their formal denomination as market regulation.  
Commentators point out that enforcement proceedings implicate complex fact 
questions about the business and management decisions, subjecting ordinary 
operations to regulatory review.  Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, 
Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56 
VAND. L. REV. 859, 895-901 (2003).  They in effect substitute for the minimalist 
state law duty of care.  Id. at 903-09; see also Joel Seligman, The New Corporate 
Law, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 2 (1993). 
 9. For a discussion of the points of preemption, see Robert B. Thompson, 
Preemption and Federalism in Corporate Governance: Protecting Shareholder 
Rights to Vote, Sell, and Sue, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 215 (1999). 
 10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
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affairs” and presumptively are left to the states.  At the national  
level we have markets and mandates, and at the state level, internal 
affairs, free contract, enabling governance strategies, and ex post 
fiduciary review. 
The internal affairs norm is fragile, both descriptively and 
normatively.  Even as it influences the national regulatory agenda 
at some level 11  and federal regulators habitually restrain their 
entries into state territory, the norm has not contained the federal 
agenda in a formal sense.  With the proxy rules, for example, the 
federal securities law shifts from regulation of market transactions 
to regulation of shareholders meetings, going deep into internal 
governance territory.  National market regulators also traverse the 
states’ enabling internal regime as they seek to assure the quality of 
financial reports, imposing compliance systems and committee 
requirements.  As the list of such interventions lengthens, a subject 
matter-based description less and less describes the content of 
corporate federalism. 
Corporate law’s complex, overlapping pattern results from more 
than a century of political and economic interaction among actors in 
large firms, in the securities markets, and in state and federal 
governments.  As a descriptive matter, it follows that federalism’s 
content can be accessed fully only if the static picture is recast in the 
historical, political, and economic framework that created it.  Such a 
dynamic description will help us address corporate federalism’s 
central issue—the weight to be accorded state control of internal 
affairs in national corporate regulation.  Two questions state the 
issue more specifically.  The first is descriptive: whether the internal 
affairs norm in fact operates as a presumption that constrains 
national-level lawmakers.  The second is normative: whether, to the 
extent the internal affairs norm does constrain at the national level, 
it follows from a reflexive subsidiarity and lacks policy content or, in 
the alternative, possesses welfare-enhancing properties.  To address 
these questions, this Article undertakes a comparative political 
economy of corporate lawmaking.  This Part evaluates lawmaking in 
the states. 
At the state level, charter competition determines corporate law 
regulatory strategies.  The question concerning the appropriate 
strength of the federal internal affairs presumption accordingly 
tends to overlap the question concerning charter competition’s 
welfare effects.  The discussion that follows enters onto this 
contested territory with a descriptive agenda.  The description leads 
us to depict the states as noncooperative players of a rent-driven 
game and Delaware as the follower of a successful, evolutionarily 
 
 11. See infra text accompanying notes 190-96. 
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stable strategy.  Corporate law emerges in a stable equilibrium 
state.  The description, in turn, implies a favorable normative 
evaluation. 
Part I.A traces the evolution of the state system, identifying its 
principal political and economic determinants.  This is a history of 
regulatory responsiveness induced by rents paid by management.  
The funding removes state corporate law from the ordinary 
influences that shape democratic government and embed state-level 
governance strategies, which show a notable constancy over time.  It 
also structurally removes corporate law from the ordinary political 
conditions that shape regulation, whether at the state or national 
level.  Externalities emerge as a distinct possibility.  It follows that, 
absent the possibility of federal intervention at the behest of actors 
disadvantaged by the state system but not represented in the 
chartering state, state-level charter competition would be 
intolerable in a federal system. 
Part I.B looks at theories that evaluate charter competition.  
First comes the trust paradigm of Berle and Means, and Cary, and 
its race to the bottom description.  Next comes the market paradigm 
of the late twentieth century and its race to the top description.  We 
show that each paradigm was directed as much against the 
competing paradigm as either was directed toward accurate 
description of the state system and its political economy.  
Contemporary descriptions correct the shortcoming, showing that 
the charter market is uncompetitive and riddled with economic 
distortions.  We do not dispute the accuracy of these descriptions.  
But we do question whether they have any significant implications 
for the internal affairs norm.  In our analysis, the presumption 
leaving internal affairs with the states emerges unscathed even as 
economic analysis places the charter market deeper and deeper in 
second-best territory. 
A. The Competitive Era 
1. New Jersey and Delaware 
In 1888 the government of New Jersey needed new sources of 
revenue.  James Brooks Dill, a New York lawyer, suggested to the 
state’s politicians that significant sums could be raised if the state 
provided an attractive domicile for the nation’s growing corporate 
population.12  The politicians countered that West Virginia already 
had tried this, liberalizing its corporate code, but without significant 
 
 12. Christopher Grandy, New Jersey Corporate Chartermongering, 1875-
1929, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 677, 680-81 (1989). 
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fiscal results.13  Indeed, in 1888, West Virginia’s Secretary of State 
was stationed at the Fifth Avenue Hotel in New York, the seal of the 
state in hand, ready to sell charters.  He found takers, but not in 
overwhelming numbers.14  Dill assured the politicians that it would 
be different with New Jersey.15  The state would not only draft a 
more liberal code, it would market the code more successfully.  
Toward the latter end, Dill organized the Corporation Trust 
Company, which would both serve as the state’s marketing arm and 
as a local agent for incorporating firms, providing them a physical 
office within the state.16  Dill, who made sure to put New Jersey’s 
Governor and Secretary of State on the Corporation Trust board of 
directors, got his corporate code.17 
The regulatory strategy was enabling.  By 1896, all significant 
ex ante constraints on corporate agents had been stripped from New 
Jersey’s code.  Governance processes took their place.  Corporations 
were left free to change their business, alter their equity capital 
structures, and amend their charters.18  More importantly, the code 
left them free to merge and combine in holding company structures19 
toward the end of facilitating anticompetitive arrangements.  New 
Jersey thus opened the door for merger20 even as other states were 
 
 13. Harold W. Stoke, Economic Influences upon Corporation Laws of New 
Jersey, 38 J.  POL.  ECON. 551, 571 (1930). 
 14. Lawrence Mitchell, Squeezing Truth From Power: The Growth of 
American Corporate Capitalism: 1899-1919 ch. 2, 15-16 (Aug. 2006) 
(unpublished book manuscript, on file with author). 
 15. Stoke, supra note 13, at 571. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Stoke, supra note 13, at 570-71, 573.  The strategy relies on federal 
constitutional law, under which corporations are treated as “persons” entitled to 
the Constitution’s protection.  Under a nineteenth-century judicial doctrine 
termed “unconstitutional conditions” it was held to that a state could not 
exclude corporations incorporated elsewhere.  See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 
ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW 1836-1937 47-48 (1991).  Under a common law 
conflict of laws rule that evolved during the twentieth century, the states 
respect the chartering states’ governance of corporate internal affairs.  See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 (1971). 
 18. Stoke, supra note 13, at 572-73. 
 19. The removal of agent constraints facilitated mergers.  The removal of 
legal capital constraints made stock watering legal, which made it possible for a 
large corporation to buy up competitors by offering stock consideration at 
bargain prices.  In addition, the code permitted different classes of stock to have 
different economic and voting rights, facilitating deal-making by making it 
possible to pay with nonvoting or low-voting shares.  RALPH NADER ET AL., 
CONSTITUTIONALIZING THE CORPORATION: THE CASE FOR THE FEDERAL 
CHARTERING OF GIANT CORPORATIONS 45 (1976). 
 20. See Brian R. Cheffins, Investor Sentiment and Antitrust Law as 
Determinants of Corporate Ownership Structure: The Great Merger Wave of 
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following the federal government and enacting antitrust laws 
modeled on the Sherman Act.21 
New Jersey’s code also held out a critical innovation respecting 
governance process: for the first time in any state code, initiation 
rights were vested in the board of directors subject to shareholder 
ratification.22  This gave managers agenda control over fundamental 
changes, including, critically, reincorporation to another state.  
(Previously, an agency theory of board authority had prevailed and 
shareholder initiative had been the rule.)23   There was also an 
innovative governance mandate: all shareholders’ meetings had to 
be held in New Jersey, providing not only rents for the state but also 
assuring that voting would be by proxy, making challenges less 
likely.24 
New Jersey’s 1896 code became the template25 for the evolution 
of the state-level corporate regime.26  Subsequent departures from it 
have opened new stretches of enabling territory but have not 
changed the system fundamentally.  The New Jersey code became 
the template because it succeeded competitively.  Half of the 
nation’s largest corporations were domiciled in New Jersey by 
1899.27  The state’s deficit was wiped out.  By 1905, its governor even 
boasted that none of the state’s income was contributed by direct 
 
1897 to 1903, 21-25 (Social Science Research Network, Working Paper, 2002), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=348480 (describing the mergers and 
showing that this period of acquisition activity amounted to a catalyst for 
diffuse equity ownership). 
 21. By 1914 all but New Jersey and six other states had done so.  Stoke, 
supra note 13, at  575.  See also HOVENKAMP, supra note 17, at 266-67. 
 22. JAMES B. DILL, THE STATUTORY AND CASE LAW APPLICABLE TO PRIVATE 
COMPANIES UNDER THE GENERAL CORPORATION ACT OF NEW JERSEY 42-43 (1898) 
(New Jersey General Corporation Act § 27). 
 23. See JOSEPH K. ANGELL & SAMUEL AMES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS AGGREGATE §§ 297-99 (10th ed. 1875); 1 VICTOR 
MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 243-44 (2d ed. 
1886).  Delaware followed in its corporations code of 1899.  See Section 135 of 
the Act of 1899, 21 Del. Laws 501 (1899); RUSSELL CARPENTER LARCOM, THE 
DELAWARE CORPORATION 11-13 (1937).  These agenda control provisions diffused 
into the codes of other states during the subsequent decades.  By 1960, twenty-
five state codes conditioned charter amendment on board approval.  See 2 
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 54 ¶ 6 (1960).  By 1970, twenty-eight state codes 
did so.  See 2 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. 2D § 59 ¶ 6 (1971). 
 24. NADER ET AL., supra note 19, at 46. 
 25. See Richard M. Buxbaum, Facilitative and Mandatory Rules in the 
Corporation Law(s) of the United States, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 249, 249 (2002) 
(noting that state codes have been facilitative since the New Jersey innovation). 
 26. New Jersey’s code in 1929 resembled “very much the laws of 1896.”  
Stoke, supra note 13, at 579. 
 27. Id. at 574. 
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payments from individuals.28 
Other states entered the new charter market.  In 1899, 
Delaware’s Josiah A. Marvel marked up his state’s corporate code to 
mimic New Jersey’s.29  (He also formed the Corporations Services 
Company and mailed advertisements.)30  Marvel’s code offered fewer 
restrictions on the issuance of stock and lower franchise fees.  It also 
carried the contractarian model to its logical conclusion by providing 
that the charter could contain any provisions not contrary to law.31  
Delaware attracted a handful of large firms but did not threaten 
New Jersey’s dominance.32  Even so, corporate revenues quickly 
constituted an important source of Delaware’s revenues, rising from 
7% of total revenues in 1899 to 20.5% in 1900 and 30.6% in 1906.33  
West Virginia, Maryland, and Maine quickly followed with revisions 
of their own codes.34  Other states soon fell into line.  By 1912, the 
laws of most of the states had been revised in varying degrees to 
follow the enabling strategy.35 
New Jersey backtracked on February 17, 1913, enacting a series 
of antitrust amendments called the “Seven Sisters.” 36   These 
variously prohibited monopolization, price fixing, and other 
anticompetitive behavior, following an agenda set by Governor 
Woodrow Wilson, who was about to be inaugurated president.37  The 
number of charters issued in New Jersey declined in succeeding 
years.38  The state’s lawmakers then had second thoughts, removing 
the salient prohibitions from the corporate code in 1915 and 1917.39 
Chartering firms neither forgave nor forgot New Jersey’s 
 
 28. NADER ET AL., supra note 19, at 48. 
 29. Id. at 51-52.  
 30. See Note, Little Delaware Makes a Bid for the Organization of Trusts, 
39 AM. L. REV. 418, 419 (1899). 
 31. See E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Statutory Developments in Business 
Corporation Law, 1886-1936, 50 HARV. L. REV. 27, 27 (1936). 
 32. NADER ET AL., supra note 19, at 503-05 tbl.5. 
 33. Id. at 535 tbl.2.  The percentage figure was volatile, however.  In 1908 
the percentage of revenues from chartering fell to 15.7%.  Id. 
 34. Stoke, supra note 13, at 575-76. 
 35. See NADER ET AL., supra note 19, at 50 (noting that forty-two states 
permitted organization for any lawful purpose; forty-three had lifted limits on 
capitalization; twenty-four permitted perpetual existence; eighteen permitted 
mergers; and forty permitted stock to be issued for noncash consideration, nine 
of which made the judgment of the board respecting the value of the 
consideration conclusive absent fraud).  Even New York proved capable of 
innovation in the removal of agent constraints by becoming the first state to 
permit no-par stock in 1912.  Dodd, Jr., supra note 31, at 44 n.68. 
 36. Stoke, supra note 13, at 578.  
 37. Id.  
 38. Id. at 574 n.74, 579. 
 39. Id. at 579. 
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defection to the antitrust side.  Delaware saw a significant increase 
in large firm incorporations and reincorporations, numbers that 
would peak during the boom years of the 1920s.40  By 1917, 36.4% of 
Delaware’s revenues came from chartering. 41   (The percentage 
peaked at 42.5% in 1929.)42  By 1922, Delaware had a clear lead, 
emerging as the state of incorporation of 55% of the firms listed on 
the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”).43 
State corporate law emerged fully formed by the boom years of 
the 1920s.  Then, as now, the terms of affiliation of corporate agents 
were left to be arranged through contract.  Then, as now, the law 
imposed no significant protections for creditors or other 
constituents.  Then, as now, ex post fiduciary law provided the 
principal constraint.  Then, as now, ultimate shareholder control 
had to be achieved through the exercise of governance mechanisms, 
the board of directors held agenda control, and the proxy voting 
system operated as a barrier to soundings of shareholder voice.44  
State law emerged in this mature form in a hotly competitive 
environment, with two states (New Jersey and Delaware) enjoying 
the lead in succession and others affirmatively vying for business.  
Competing state actors were highly incentivized, between the twin 
payoffs of a significant positive impact on state revenues and private 
rents for key state actors from stakes in service companies. 
Two additional points should be noted about the early period.  
Charter competition was invented by a New York corporate lawyer 
and from the very beginning was fully compatible with the interests 
of New York’s corporate bar.45  Transactions involving New Jersey 
and Delaware corporations closed in New York, stage managed by 
New York lawyers, without any fee sharing with New Jersey or 
Delaware lawyers.  From the beginning, lawyers in financial centers 
opined on due organization under New Jersey and Delaware law, 
ignoring the usual formal requisite of membership in the bar of the 
state law applied in the opinion. 46   Delaware’s famously well-
 
 40. NADER ET AL., supra note 19, at 503-05 tbl.5. 
 41. Id. at 535 tbl.2. 
 42. Id. at 536 tbl.2. 
 43. LARCOM, supra note 23, at 174. 
 44. For a summary of the operation of the state codes, see Dodd, Jr., supra 
note 31, at 51. 
 45. NADER ET AL., TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 50-52, 54 (1976). 
 46. See Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Committee on Real 
Property Law, Subcommittee on Mortgage Loan Opinions & the New York 
State Bar Association, Real Property Law Section, Attorney Opinion Letters 
Committee, Mortgage Loan Opinion Report, 54 BUS. L. 119, 140 (1998) 
(explaining that New York lawyers give Delaware law opinions); see also 
Committee on Corporations, 1989 Report of the Committee on Corporations of 
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compensated bar47 conducts a litigation practice. 
Secondly, the states competed for charters and created enabling 
codes against a constant threat of federal intervention.  Bills 
proposing federal incorporation of large firms, modeled on 
nineteenth-century corporate codes that restricted size, lines of 
business, and mergers, were a staple of congressional life from 1900 
until 1914.48  All were motivated by a perceived public interest in 
competitive production and against industry concentration.49  But 
the clamour for corporate reform abated after 1914.50  At both the 
state and federal levels a consensus formed that the Sherman Act’s 
approach to antitrust, broadly directed to restraints of trade, worked 
better than corporate law’s rules-based restrictions on lines of 
business and combinations, which had not provided a viable basis 
for distinguishing between good and bad mergers.51 
2. State Corporate Codes after 1913 
Legislative innovation at the state level never again reached the 
intensity experienced in the wake of New Jersey’s competitive 
initiative.  But three smaller waves of change did occur in 
subsequent decades.  Here we describe the first two, which occurred 
in the 1920s and 1960s.  The third wave, the state antitakeover 
statutes of the 1980s, will be taken up in Part I.B.3.52 
The first round of innovation came in the wake of the boom 
stock market of the 1920s.  Corporations and their promoters, 
utilizing the corporate codes’ allowance of nonvoting preferred and 
common stock, took advantage of the market boom to float new 
equity issues that carried no sacrifice of control.  But, in 1926, the 
NYSE intervened with a one share/one vote rule. 53   Delaware 
followed up with give backs, removing from its code some remaining 
constraints on stock issuance.  First, in 1927, it removed one last 
mandate respecting affiliation terms—preemptive rights—which 
 
the Business Law Section of the State Bar of California Regarding Legal 
Opinions in Business Transactions, 45 BUS. L. 2169, 2198 (1990); Scott 
FitzGibbon & Donald W. Glazer, Legal Opinions on Incorporation, Good 
Standing, and Qualification to Do Business, 41 BUS. L. 461, 473 (1986). 
 47. Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in 
Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679, 695 (2002) (showing that Delaware 
lawyers are the most highly paid in any state). 
 48. Mitchell, supra note 14, at ch. 6, 1-4. 
 49. Id.  See also John W. Brabner-Smith, Federal Incorporation of Business, 
24 VA. L. REV. 159, 163-66 (1937). 
 50. Stoke, supra note 13, at 579. 
 51. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 17, at 247-48, 266-67. 
 52. See infra notes 107-17 and accompanying text. 
 53. Joel Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The One 
Common Share, One Vote Controversy, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 687, 687 (1987). 
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thereafter became optional.54  Second, in March 1929, it amended its 
code to permit blank stock charter provisions, 55  permitting 
corporations to waive shareholder ratification respecting the terms 
of new stock issues and enhancing management ’ s freedom of 
action respecting equity capital structure.56  Third, and also in 
March 1929, Delaware sanctioned the issue of stock option 
warrants, facilitating the distribution of bargain purchase rights to 
insiders even in a world of one share/one vote.57 
 
Figure I: Market Context 1920-4158 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The stock market crash six months later caused the venue of 
corporate law innovation to move to the national level and stay 
there for three decades.  At the same time, new incorporation 
activity in Delaware slowed substantially.  Delaware would not 
equal the dollar amount of its 1929 chartering revenues until 1952.59  
Even then, 1952 in no sense equalled 1929 so far as concerned 
Delaware’s public fisc.  The portion of its revenues contributed by 
chartering would remain under ten percent of the total until after 
1967.  Worse, during the 1950s and early 1960s, reincorporation to 
Delaware continued only at the diminished pace set during the 
 
 54. JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF 
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 
43 (1982). 
 55. Id. 
 56. NADER ET AL., supra note 19, at 56-57.  Delaware also added a loophole 
in its legal capital provisions in the late 1920s—the “nimble dividend.”  Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Yahoo! Finance, http://finance.yahoo.com (graph developed using the 
opening level of the Dow Jones Industrial Average on the first trading day of 
each month over the course of the cycle). 
 59. NADER ET AL., supra note 19, at 535-36 tbl.2. 
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Depression.60 
By 1963, revenues from chartering had declined to seven 
percent of Delaware’s total, and its lawmakers began to fear 
competition from New Jersey and Maryland. 61   The legislature 
organized a law revision commission to review the code.62  Another 
round of innovation followed, with the amendments becoming 
effective in 1967.63  These added an enabling section liberalizing 
indemnity of officers and directors found liable for breaches of 
fiduciary duties.64  The amendments also significantly narrowed the 
class of shareholders accorded merger appraisal rights,65 facilitating 
acquisitions by large firms.66  Figure II shows that the equity market 
environment at the time resembled that prevailing during the first 
round of code innovations of the late 1920s: Delaware returned to an 
aggressive, competitive mode in the “go go” stock market of the 
1960s, during which the Dow Jones Industrial Average reached the 
900 level for the first time since 1929.67 
Figure II: Market Context 1960-75 68 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 60.  
 62. Id. at 60-61. 
 63. Id. at 64.  
 64. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (2001). 
 65. Id. § 262(b). 
 66. Comment, Law for Sale: A Study of the Delaware Corporation Law of 
1967, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 861, 863-72 (1969).  For a realistic description of the 
influences that came to bear on the revision, see Ernest L. Folk III, Some 
Reflections of a Corporation Law Draftsman, 42 CONN. BAR J. 409, 411-19 
(1968).   
 67. NADER ET AL., supra note 19, at 66; Yahoo! Finance, 
http://finance.yahoo.com (daily Dow Jones Industrial Average data from Oct. 1, 
1928 through Dec. 31, 1969).  
 68. Yahoo! Finance, http://finance.yahoo.com (graph developed using the 
opening level of the Dow Jones Industrial Average on the first trading day of 
each month over the course of the cycle). 
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Delaware’s initiative yielded palpable rewards.  Incorporations 
and reincorporations of large firms increased markedly in 1966 and 
continued through 1971 at levels not seen since the 1920s.69  Even 
though other states quickly copied the new provisions, Delaware’s 
market share recovered to one-third of NYSE companies.70  Since 
then, Delaware has steadily increased that market share.  By 1977, 
40% of publicly traded companies were organized in Delaware;71 in 
1981 the figure was 44%;72 the 50% figure was reached again by 
1991;73 and by 1999 the figure was 57.8%.74 
3. Stability and Political Insulation 
We emerge from this discussion with a confirmation, a 
prediction, and a structural conclusion. 
The confirmation is that state legislative innovation tends to 
enhance management’s freedom of action by expanding the enabling 
envelope.75 
The prediction is that management-friendly innovation tends to 
occur against the background of a strong stock market.  Concerns 
about legitimacy and federal intervention could have something to 
do with this, but marketing does also.  Corporations tend to bring 
reincorporation proposals to their shareholders in the wake of 
abnormal run ups in their stock prices.76  The competitive state 
strikes while the iron is hot, drawing attention to its product line so 
 
 69. NADER ET AL., supra note 19, at 505 tbl.5. 
 70. Comment, supra note 66, at 891-92. 
 71. See Peter Dodd & Richard Leftwich, The Market for Corporate Charters: 
“Unhealthy Competition” Versus Federal Regulation, 53 J. BUS. 259, 262 (1980). 
 72. Stephanie S. Rojo, Comment, Delaware Versus Texas Corporate Law: 
How Does Texas Compare?, 3 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 290, 291 (2003). 
 73. Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate 
Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 187, 
190-91 n.6 (1991). 
 74. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms’ Decisions Where to 
Incorporate, 46 J.L. & ECON. 383, 391 tbl.2 (2003). 
 75. We do not claim that all states match Delaware in providing menus of 
enabling terms.  For a survey of some residual mandates and an empirical 
showing of their contribution to outward migration, see Marcel Kahan, The 
Demand for Corporate Law: Statutory Flexibility, Judicial Quality, or Takeover 
Protection? (N.Y. Univ. Law and Econ. Research Paper Series, working paper 
No. 04-017, 2004) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=557869.  For a 
contrarian discussion questioning the appropriateness of mandates for 
corporate law regimes in emerging economies, see Troy A. Paredes, A Systems 
Approach to Corporate Governance Reform: Why Importing U.S. Corporate Law 
Isn’t the Answer, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055, 1127, 1155 (2004). 
 76. See Michael Bradley & Cindy A. Schipani, The Relevance of the Duty of 
Care Standard in Corporate Governance, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1, 67 (1989); Dodd & 
Leftwich, supra note 71, at 272-78. 
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as to focus management’s attention on the benefits of 
reincorporation. 
The structural point concerns the overall trajectory of state 
legislative innovation.  The post-1913 rounds of innovation amount 
to minor adjustments to a stable legal regime.  New Jersey set the 
states’ enabling agenda in 1888 and the agenda remained stable for 
eight decades thereafter. 77   The economic shock of crash and 
depression at most brought quietude.  The only political shock came 
when Woodrow Wilson took the presidency and the New Jersey 
legislature opened its code to the influence of the broader public’s 
political concerns.  The management customers in the charter 
market reacted emphatically.  The message has never changed: 
public politics and corporate law do not mix; any significant 
departure from the norm means reincorporation to another state. 
Political theorists evaluate political systems in terms of their 
accountability and representativeness.  Accountability is high when 
voters can identify the actors responsible for making policy and oust 
those who perform badly.  Representativeness is high when policies 
reflect the preferences of a large spectrum of voters.78  The larger the 
political subdivision, the more likely it is that policies are broadly 
representative, as politicians are forced to seek the support of broad 
coalitions, representing multiple socioeconomic groups.  In smaller 
districts, competing politicians may cater to narrower, geographical 
constituencies.79 
Charter competition rearranges the conventional patterns.  The 
possibility of reincorporation out of the state assures a high degree 
of accountability.  But now accountability goes not to the voters of 
the state (whether a broad or narrow coalition), but to the firms’ 
managers and shareholders, who react not as voting citizens but as 
economic interest holders.  Paradoxically, we simultaneously see a 
high degree of representativeness, at least in the one state with a 
stake in chartering revenues.  So far as the concerns the people of 
Delaware, any corporate law policy that suits the chartering 
customers also suits them.  This complete concord between the 
voters of the chartering state and the chartered firms cordons off 
corporate law from conventional political influences and 
concomitant regulatory volatility.  Such a stable political settlement 
could never be reached at the federal level, where broad political 
 
 77. Bayless Manning pronounced corporate law intellectually dead in 1962.  
See Bayless Manning, The Shareholder’s Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank 
Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223, 245 n.37 (1962). 
 78. TORSTEN PERSSON & GUIDO TABELLINI, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF 
CONSTITUTIONS 12, 17 (2003). 
 79. Id. at 17-18. 
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coalitions could contest it. 
The stable settlement holds out a possibility of externalities, of 
course.  Even as the dominant chartering state makes corporate law 
without regard to conventional politics within its borders, its firms 
carry its law across the wider national political and economic 
geography.  As a national lawmaker, it potentially impacts the 
economic interests of actors nationwide, actors who may be badly 
represented or entirely unrepresented in its lawmaking process and 
to whom it is unaccountable.  To the extent that corporate law has 
political implications at the more broadly representative national 
arena, such an arrangement is politically tolerable only given the 
possibility of preemption by the national government.  Any 
disadvantaged group or broad public interest coalition gets a right to 
contest the state-level result by making a political appeal to the 
Congress.  In view of the fact that a chartering state may impose its 
law outside its borders only due to a federal constitutional 
mandate,80 federal political contestability makes structural sense. 
B. Chartering Races 
Because national-level political appeals are a constant 
structural possibility, national respect for state control over internal 
corporate affairs remains in a contingent posture.  The magnitude of 
respect accorded could vary in response to prevailing views on the 
state system’s welfare effects, with normative frameworks used in 
evaluating the state system bearing on national responses.  This 
section sets out the two leading evaluative paradigms: trust and 
market.  Under the trust paradigm, charter competition is described 
as a race to the bottom.  The market paradigm reverses the story, 
describing a race to the top. 
1. The Trust Paradigm and the Race to the Bottom 
The race to the bottom charge dates back to charter 
competition’s first appearance, when critics denounced it for 
facilitating anticompetitive activity.81  Subsequent decades saw no 
abatement of criticism, even as the critics shifted their focus.  The 
leading basis for denunciation became the trust paradigm 
articulated in 1932 by Berle and Means in The Modern Corporation 
and Private Property.82 
The enabling state system, said Berle and Means, had 
facilitated the appearance and success of the large, mass-producing, 
 
 80. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 81. See Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 580 (1933) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
 82. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 3. 
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management-controlled corporation.83  The law thereby had become 
implicated in the creation and perpetuation of an unsatisfactory 
separation of ownership and control.  The big corporations of the 
twentieth century had split the classical entrepreneurial function 
between salaried executives, who sat atop hierarchical 
organizations, and anonymous equity participants, who held small 
stakes and prized market liquidity over participation.  This 
presented problems of competence and responsibility absent in an 
ideal, classical, capitalist world inhabited by self-employed 
individual producers.84  In the classical model, market competition 
effectively controlled the producers, constraining both the 
incompetent and the greedy and legitimating private economic 
power.  But corporate mass production on a large capital base broke 
those parameters, with firms taking on significant attributes and 
powers, social as well as economic.85  Industrial oligarchs exercised 
unified control over the wealth under their charge, and the law 
played a role in investing the power.86  Therefore, said Berle and 
Means, corporate property should no longer be deemed private 
property.87  That assertion in turn supported a presumption favoring 
new regulation of corporate internal affairs. 
Berle and Means recommended no pervasive system of national 
oversight, however.  Instead, they focused on the problem of 
management self-dealing in the context of the enabling system.  
Corporate insiders were writing their own contracts, with immunity 
clauses and waivers of shareholder rights allowing much diversion 
of corporate profit to managers’ pockets.88  The law, they said, would 
do a better job if it were rewritten to follow basic principles of trust 
law.89  More particularly, there should be a pervasive equitable 
limitation on powers granted to corporate management (or any other 
group within the corporation) by the enabling system: power should 
be exercisable only for the ratable benefit of all the shareholders.90  
Enforcement of the equitable limitation safely could be remitted to 
the state judiciary.  In Berle and Means’ view, charter competition 
impacted only statutes, leaving the common law of fiduciary duties 
as the one area of corporate law remaining robust: “[f]lexible and 
 
 83. Id. at 7.  
 84. Id. at 3, 5, 7, 9. 
 85. Id. at 3. 
 86. Id. at 4, 131. 
 87. Id. at 219. 
 88. Id. at 128, 220, 312. 
 89. Id. at 220.  
 90. Id. at 220.  Berle and Means had in mind an overarching standard that 
would constrain the enabling system ex post: no language in a corporate charter 
could deny or defeat the fundamental equitable control of the court.  Id. at 242. 
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realistic” judges, “if untrammeled by statute,” could be expected to 
find solutions to problems that demanded a remedy.91 
Events did not unfold in accordance with the book’s description, 
however.  Delaware’s judges did indeed prove “[f]lexible and 
realistic,” but their flexibility followed their realism and so benefited 
management interests.  By the 1960s, observers attempting to 
explain why no other state had wrested a significant market share 
away from Delaware were mentioning Delaware’s courts as well as 
its code.  The accumulated stock of precedent was mentioned, along 
with competence and fairness.  But Sam Arsht, a dean of the 
Delaware bar, added a telling point—corporations considered 
Delaware the most favorable forum available.92 
The results frustrated proponents of the trust paradigm, whose 
views were embodied in William L. Cary’s famous indictment of 
Delaware, published in 1974.93  Cary reviewed leading Delaware 
opinions, along with the statutory developments reviewed above, 
and concluded that Delaware had “no public policy left . . . except 
the objective of raising revenue.”94  To Cary, the “public policy” at 
stake was the integrity of corporate managers.  Rents had led a 
single state to “grant management unilateral control untrammeled 
by other interests,”95 thereby sacrificing the national public interest.  
Charter competition was a “race to the bottom.”  The stable 
settlement between Delaware and the chartering firms meant that 
corporate law addressed only the interests of a narrow class of 
management consumers, causing it to be more and more removed 
from the public interest. 
Cary recommended a preemptive federal regime of fiduciary 
standards, a traversal of internal affairs that might have enervated 
the charter market.  Unlike the federal mandates we see in 
practice, 96  fiduciary standards would have removed fiduciary 
lawmaking to the federal courts, destroying Delaware’s body of case 
precedents and removing its judiciary from the front line of 
corporate lawmaking.  Given the gradual convergence of corporate 
 
 91. Id. at 197, 295. 
 92. Comment, supra note 66, at 893-94. 
 93. William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon 
Delaware, 83 YALE  L.J. 663 (1974). 
 94. Id. at 684; see also Marvin A. Chirelstein, Towards a Federal Fiduciary 
Standards Act, 30 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 203 (1981). 
 95. Cary, supra note 93, at 697, 698. 
 96. If the federal mandates described above at any time adversely affected 
Delaware, they did so in the period between 1929 and 1967, when Delaware lost 
market share and suffered reduced revenue support from chartering.  Since the 
mandates stayed in place after Delaware’s 1967 recovery, it seems sounder to 
refrain from inferring a negative impact during any period. 
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codes, Delaware’s customers thereupon might have reappraised the 
costs and benefits of domicile in the state.97 
2. The Market Paradigm and the Race to the Top 
The market paradigm rebuts both the trust paradigm’s 
description of separated ownership and control and its call for 
regulation.  This perspective, which originated in economics during 
the 1960s and 1970s, recasts the firm as an incident of contracting 
among rational economic actors.98  The firm becomes a series of 
contracts joining inputs to outputs, with equity capital as one of the 
inputs and corporate law as a part of the input’s governing 
contract.99  The imperfections identified under the trust paradigm 
reemerge under the denomination “agency costs,” costs that firms 
must minimize due to the free market’s competitive force.  Managers 
are no longer seen as empowered actors, and responsibility is no 
longer seen as a problem.  When managers fail, they get removed—
either a hostile offeror takes over the company and throws them 
out,100 the firm with a high agency cost base fails to survive in the 
product market, or poor managers fail to survive in the management 
labor market.  Their incentives accordingly are focused on long-run 
productive success for the firm.101  Given these market deterrents, 
corporate property again becomes private, the regulatory agenda 
goes blank, and a powerful presumption lies against national 
intervention.102 
 
 97. While Berle and Means limited the trust paradigm’s class of 
beneficiaries to the corporation’s shareholders, many of the paradigm’s 
subsequent proponents expanded the zone of beneficiary to include other 
corporate constituents and the public interest.  The “public” characterization in 
THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY invited the extension.  So did 
the book’s emphasis on managerial power: to mid-twentieth century 
antimanagerialists, power implied responsibility and, given the separation of 
ownership and control, responsibility needed to be imposed in law—federal law.  
See NADER, ET AL., supra note 45, at 1, 7; see also Robert A. Dahl, Governing the 
Giant Corporation, in CORPORATE POWER IN AMERICA 10, 12 (Ralph Nader & 
Mark J. Green eds., 1973). 
 98. William W. Bratton, The “Nexus of Contracts” Corporation: A Critical 
Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407, 420 (1989).  
 99. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 4, at 305, 310.  For a review of the 
literature, see Bratton, supra note 98, at 420. 
 100. This point originated in Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for 
Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 120 n.34 (1965).  For a discussion of 
Manne’s contribution, see William J. Carney, The Legacy of “The Market for 
Corporate Control” and the Origins of the Theory of the Firm,  50 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 215 (1999). 
 101. Bratton, supra note 98, at 417-18. 
 102. William W. Bratton, The Economic Structure of the Post-Contractual 
Corporation, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 180, 186-90 (1992). 
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The market paradigm also counters Cary’s denunciation of 
Delaware.  It draws on public choice theory to debunk the public 
interest ideal of regulatory motivation and assert that regulators 
should be expected to behave no differently than actors in private 
economic relations. 103   There is, accordingly, nothing suspicious 
about the sale of charters.  This point, coupled with the market 
deterrent story of well-aligned agent incentives, reverses the race to 
the bottom into a race to the top. 104   In the race to the top 
description, state corporate codes and judicial venues are viewed as 
products consumed by corporations.  Competition for the legal 
business of firms forces the states to adapt the law to the dynamic 
conditions in which the firms operate.  State lawmaking emerges as 
a trial-and-error process suited to the accurate identification of 
optimal corporate arrangements.105 
3. State Antitakeover Statutes, the Structural Defect, and the 
Failure of the Market Paradigm 
Each paradigm, trust and market, has a strong ideological 
affinity.  The trust perspective suits progressives disposed to impose 
regulations that disempower managers and protect actors in 
vulnerable economic positions.  As such, it lost its leading role in 
public policy discussion after 1980, along with the general collapse 
of confidence in regulatory solutions to economic problems.  The 
trust paradigm still echoes in a significant body of academic 
commentary.106  But it neither informs corporate law agendas in the 
wider polity nor figures importantly in contemporary criticisms of 
the charter competition system. 
The market paradigm presents an ideological mirror image.  It 
suits deregulatory policy agendas and devolutionary federalists.  
The deregulatory 1980s should have carried it to unquestioned 
ascendancy in corporate law discussions.  But it instead ran into an 
unanticipated public choice problem when the mature, state-level 
enabling system underwent a third and final round of statutory 
innovation.107 
 
 
 103. Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public 
Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167, 
168-69 (1990). 
 104. See Ralph W. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the 
Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 254-62 (1977). 
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 106. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production 
Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999) (challenging the shareholder 
primacy norm). 
 107. See infra notes 109-13. 
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Figure III: Market Context 1982-88108 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
During the 1980s, a majority of the states added antitakeover 
provisions to their codes.  The statutes entered territory where free 
contract formerly had prevailed, making takeovers more expensive 
and variously containing shareholder rights of alienation and 
decisionmaking.109  The statutes began to appear in the 1960s and 
1970s, but changed in form after 1982, when the Supreme Court, in 
Edgar v. MITE Corp.,110 invoked the Commerce Clause to invalidate 
state statutes that subjected hostile tender offers to substantive 
review by state securities administrators.  The new statutes, which 
operated in traditional internal affairs territory, passed 
constitutional inspection in 1987, when the Supreme Court decided 
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America.111  Twenty states enacted 
such statutes in the years between the two rulings, with fourteen 
more acting in the six months after CTS.112  Delaware, lagging, 
followed in 1988.113 
The antitakeover round followed the earlier pattern of state law 
innovation in two significant respects.  The statutes once again were 
enacted against the backdrop of a booming stock market, as shown 
 
 108. Yahoo! Finance, http://finance.yahoo.com (generated using the closing 
price of the Dow Jones Industrial Average on each day of the historical period); 
see also Roberta Romano, The Future of Hostile Takeovers: Legislation and 
Public Opinion, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 457, 461-63 (1988). 
 109. More specifically, the statutes tended either to condition the voting 
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periods on combinations between bidders and targets, or to require that an 
equal price be paid in the second stage of a two-tier acquisition.  For a 
summary, see ROMANO, supra note 105, at 53-57, 74-75. 
 110. 457 U.S. 624, 640-46 (1982). 
 111. 481 U.S. 69 (1987). 
 112. Romano, supra note 108, at 461. 
 113. Id. at 464, 464 n.16. 
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above in Figure III.  They also catered to management’s interest in 
freedom of action. 
But the antitakeover statutes also broke the pattern in 
significant respects.  Innovations in the bull markets of the 1920s 
and 1960s facilitated deal making; here the states chilled 
transactions. 114   Formerly, state law innovation almost always 
moved in an enabling direction.  Here, even as the governance 
device of shareholder ratification figured prominently, so did 
mandates.  Formerly, the first mover had been Delaware, the 
charter market leader.  Here, states that did not pursue charters 
made the first move.  Where Delaware innovated with an eye to 
business preferences nationwide, the states enacting antitakeover 
statutes moved at the behest of nervous managers with local 
influence. 115   The politics were unrepresentative.  Threatened 
managers and local lawyers, acting independently of local business, 
labor, and community leaders, used their influence to procure 
legislation.116  The responsive legislators in effect externalized the 
costs of takeover defense on out-of-state shareholders.  Rising stock 
prices also figured into the picture: takeover activity, friendly as 
well as hostile, rises and falls with the stock market. 
The Delaware process differed, reflecting the more diverse 
constituency swept in by its law’s national reach.  Managers seeking 
protection (and their lawyers) lobbied in favor of takeover defense, 
some even threatening to pull out of the state.  They were countered 
by institutional investors, shareholders organizations, and SEC 
commissioners. 117  A weak statute emerged. 
The equilibrium pattern broke because, with the hostile offers of 
the 1980s, the enabling framework, for the first time in its history, 
held out an effective means of management removal unimpeded by 
the shareholder collective action problem.  When the states adjusted 
by erecting new barriers, the shareholders, again for the first time 
in corporate law history, went into irreconcilable opposition.  
Previously, the states’ successive moves to extend managers more 
slack had failed to rouse shareholder opposition.  There were a 
number of reasons for the shareholders’ cooperative attitude.  First, 
as the trust proponents noted, the shareholders suffered collective 
action problems.  Second, under the Wall Street Rule, shareholders 
were content to resort to exit by market sale when excessive slack 
led to poor results.  Third, since 1934, the SEC had stood in to 
 
 114. Id. at 462.  
 115. Id. at 461.  
 116. Id. at 462. 
 117. Id. at 463-64. 
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protect shareholder interests at the national level.118  Sleazy market 
practices facilitated by enabling innovations in the 1920s had been 
dealt with by federal disclosure and market regulation mandates.  
In the 1980s, however, federal regulators did not come to the 
shareholders’ rescue.  Institutional shareholding, meanwhile, 
ameliorated the collective action problem.  Now organized, the 
shareholders found their voice, a dissenting voice. 
Just as the market paradigm had enervated the trust paradigm, 
so did the market paradigm now suffer enervation.  The market-
based race to the top validation of state law had bypassed the 
problem of the shareholders’ lack of influence over state lawmaking 
with a reference to the control market deterrent.  The assertion, in 
effect, was that the managers’ option of exit adequately disciplined 
the states, while the possibility of shareholder exit by tender to a 
hostile offeror adequately disciplined the managers.  The 
collaboration of managers and state politicians to hamper the 
market deterrent presented a manifest case of charter market 
failure.  The responsive states had acted to contain the very 
mechanism on which the market paradigm relied to incentivize 
corporate agents.  Charter competition, far from acting as a check on 
rent-seeking activity, had promoted it.  State law results were 
anything but first-best efficient. 
The failure of the market analogy was inevitable, given the 
crystallization of opposing views between shareholders and 
managers on the power implications of the shareholders’ right of 
free transfer.  The law as product analogy works as a policy 
justification only to the extent that the supplying jurisdiction 
purveys an unbundled regulatory product to a consumer with a 
unitary set of preferences, without externalizing costs on anyone 
else.  The charter market does meet the former qualification—
Delaware’s customers take only its corporate law free of all other 
regulations.  The latter qualification has always been problematic, 
for it depends on the heroic assumption that shareholder and 
manager interests always are perfectly aligned, rendering irrelevant 
the mandated agenda control managers enjoy under the state 
system.  Where, as with takeovers, interests do not stand aligned, 
the state system displays a structural defect.  Because the market 
forces a state that actually competes to focus on the variables that 
influence incorporation decisions, 119  there follows a concern for 
 
 118. The promulgation of the proxy rules in the 1950s provides an example 
of this.  See SELIGMAN, supra note 54, at 270. 
 119. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable 
Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1452, 
1454  (1992). 
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management preferences rather than shareholder value itself.  
Accordingly, nothing at the state level prevents suboptimal 
accommodation of management preferences respecting ex post 
affiliation terms and fiduciary standards.120 
Since the defect is intrinsic to the system, regulatory correction 
must occur at the national level.  Should the issue be joined there, 
and should the diagnosis of suboptimal results prevail there, the 
internal affairs presumption, standing alone, would present no 
barrier to intervention.  The economics of federalism posit 
intervention to police interstate externalities as a principal 
justification for the very existence of the national government.121  
Moreover, such intervention could be designed so as to cause 
minimal disruption at the state level.  It could even prove beneficial.  
We have suggested elsewhere that the federal government could 
partially preempt the states’ provision of management agenda 
control and mandate a right of shareholder initiative to effect 
reincorporation.122  We projected that such an adjustment could 
jumpstart the charter market and import a state-level incentive to 
create a regime more single-mindedly directed to shareholder value 
maximization. 123   Lucian Bebchuk and Allen Ferrell apply this 
strategy in a different direction, suggesting that the federal 
government create a parallel takeover regime and accord the 
shareholders a privilege to opt into it.124  There is, then, no shortage 
of regulatory strategies fitted to the task of correcting the charter 
market’s defects.  Yet the federal government has not intervened, 
even as the era of shareholder capitalism dawned in the wake of the 
takeover wars of the 1980s. 
4. How Robust is the Charter Market? 
A growing body of commentary criticizes Delaware and the 
charter market from a different perspective, that of microeconomic 
theory.  The market, it is charged, little resembles an efficient 
product market—a market that maximizes welfare by producing in 
 
 120. Id. at 1462-63, 1468, 1488. 
 121. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Federalism and European Business Law, 14 
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 125, 127 (1994). 
 122. William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Regulatory Competition, 
Regulatory Capture, and Corporate Self-Regulation, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1861, 1936-
47 (1995). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, A New Approach to Takeover 
Law and Regulatory Competition, 87 VA. L. REV. 111 (2001).  See Stephen J. 
Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Choice and Federal Intervention in Corporate Law, 
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the competitive equilibrium quantity.125  It is instead a bundle of 
suboptimal distortions. 126   Delaware charges much more for its 
product than its marginal cost of production and its franchise tax 
rates implicate price discrimination. 127   Other states have no 
incentives to compete with Delaware, leaving their regimes open to 
suboptimal influence activities by managers and lawyers.128  Even if 
actors in another state had incentives to attempt to enter the 
market to take market share from Delaware, structural barriers 
would make competitive success highly unlikely.129  Delaware, for 
example, takes the benefit of network and learning externalities 
incident to the sale of an integrated legal system.130  Its system also 
is surprisingly friendly to litigating plaintiffs, toward the manifest 
end of generating rents for its bar.131 
This thickening description teaches us much about the charter 
market.  But we do not perceive any significant implications for the 
internal affairs presumption and the content of federalism.  We have 
five reasons.  First, the regulatory competition description of state 
 
 125. HOWELL E. JACKSON ET AL., ANALYTICAL METHODS FOR LAWYERS 325 
(2003). 
 126. Oren Bar-Gill et al., The Market for Corporate Law, (Harvard John M. 
Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. and Bus., Discussion Paper No. 377, 2002) develops a 
formal product market model that incorporates many of the main points of this 
line of thinking. 
 127. See Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the Market 
for Corporate Law, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1205, 1211, 1215-19 (2001); see also 
Michal Barzuza, Price Considerations in the Market for Corporate Law, 26 
CARDOZO L. REV. 127, 132 (2004) (describing Delaware’s pricing as reflecting a 
trade off between benefits to managers and injury to shareholder value due to 
suboptimal law, with Delaware charging less than it might otherwise). 
 128. Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in 
Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679, 735-40 (2002). 
 129. See Lucian Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence Favor State Competition 
in Corporate Law?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1775, 1820 (2002); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & 
Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the 
Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 557 (2002). 
 130. See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate 
Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 347 (1996); Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of 
Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1910 (1998); Michael 
Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. 
REV. 757, 845-46 (1995). 
 131. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group 
Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 471-72 (1987).  See also 
Robert Daines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559, 
1580 (2002) (noting that the personal interests of chartering lawyers in addition 
to the substance of the legal regime determines the choice of domicile); Kahan & 
Kamar, supra note 128, at 695 (showing that Delaware lawyers have average 
incomes higher than those of any other state). 
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law only provides a self-standing justification on the assumption a 
parallel market for corporate control imports incentive 
compatibility.  Once the states chilled the takeover threat, federal 
intervention could be justified whether or not Delaware faced active 
competition.  Second, the structure of state law showed remarkable 
stability between 1896 and the takeover wars of the 1980s, and that 
structure was determined in a manifestly competitive environment.  
Potential entrants prompted Delaware to legislative action as late 
as 1967.132  Third, Delaware always remains subject to potential 
competition from other states.  If, like New Jersey in 1913,133 it 
defected from the political settlement and took a public-interest 
view of regulation, the firms would find somewhere else to go.  The 
same thing would happen if the quality of its lawmaking took a 
costly adverse turn.  Similarly, were Delaware to raise its rents to 
the point where firms found it too costly, its business would drop off, 
causing it to reconsider both its franchise tax scheme and litigation 
rules.  Fourth, no one forces firms to go to Delaware and pay the 
rents.  And if there is a group of consumers in the world well suited 
to contractual self-protection, it is Delaware’s customers.  Indeed, 
more than forty percent of publicly traded firms choose to stay out.134  
So, even though a pinpointed federal intervention could in theory 
jumpstart the charter market, such intervention is a remote 
possibility as a political proposition.  Excess rents to Delaware and 
other imperfections highlighted by analogy to the economics of 
industrial organization seem an improbable basis for invoking 
national entry into internal affairs. 
Fifth, and most important, the economics of federalism looks 
beyond competition to support a presumption favoring state- and 
local-level regulation.  So long as production costs are equal, 
decentralized regulation is favored because it is more responsive—it 
narrows the variance in the distribution of preferences, reduces the 
likelihood of bundled preferences, and ameliorates problems of 
asymmetric information.135  On the majority of matters as to which 
management and shareholder interests stand in alignment, the 
century-old political settlement between firms and the competitive 
chartering state, with its extraordinarily high degree of 
accountability, fits this description.  At the same time, the market 
paradigm succeeds in an important respect, despite its 
 
 132. NADER ET AL., supra note 19, at 64.  
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shortcomings.  Cary’s public interest objection to the sale of 
corporate law no longer carries weight.  Charter competition is no 
longer seen as inherently corrupt.  It is viewed functionally in the 
wider legal and economic framework of shareholder capitalism. 
The picture of an uncompetitive charter market holds out 
devastating implications not for the internal affairs presumption but 
for the economic theory of regulatory competition.  This economics 
dates back a half century.  It got off to a bright start.  For a while it 
was thought that devolution within federations could be relied on to 
trigger races to the top respecting diverse subject matters.  
Competition for domiciliaries and factors of production was posited 
as the cure for public choice problems.  Under the theory, citizens 
signal their preferences respecting legal goods and services when 
they migrate from regime to regime.  Their ability to exit 
disempowers government actors, whose welfare diminishes as 
citizens depart, taking along votes and revenues.136  Competition for 
domiciliaries and factors of production, having disabled the interest 
groups, then causes government policies to be matched with diverse 
citizen preferences. 137   A preference for state over national 
lawmaking also is implied, since the revenue enhancement 
constraint on the national government is less intense.138  Because 
national-level competitive constraints also are less intense, the 
national lawmaking process will be slower, less responsive to 
productive concerns, and more susceptible to the influence of 
organized interest groups.139 
The theory ran into two problems.  First, multiple frictions at 
the state level impair competition.  These include product bundling, 
mobility costs, spillovers, information asymmetries, and the absence 
of entrepreneurial incentives on the part of government actors.140  
Second, even assuming competitive incentives at the state level, the 
economics proved incapable of predicting stable, long-term 
equilibriums in competitive lawmaking situations. 141   Charter 
competition, along with other cases where a conflict of laws regime 
allows actors to chose a nominal jurisdictional situs for a legal 
relationship, are the exceptional cases where the theory has 
descriptive power.  This is because nominally sited legal 
relationships can be sold separately as unbundled legal products.142  
 
 136. See Ronald J. Daniels, Should Provinces Compete?  The Case for a 
Competitive Corporate Law Market, 36 MCGILL L.J. 130, 142-43 (1991). 
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 138. Id. at 4-5, 48. 
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Given something to sell, entrepreneurial lawmakers can appear.  Of 
course, as we have seen with New Jersey and Delaware, a 
concomitant private sector sideline, in the form of service company 
profits, may be necessary to jump start the operation.  But the 
service companies, along with other rent-seeking intermediaries, 
also serve a market function because they correct information 
asymmetries.  With corporate law, a stable lawmaking equilibrium 
resulted.  But, as we also have seen, externalities have remained a 
problem. 
The scholarship highlighting the charter market’s 
uncompetitive character shows that the problems do not stop with 
externalities.  Even in these close to ideal conditions we have yet to 
see a competitive lawmaking equilibrium that stands up when 
inspected under the criteria applied to product markets.  We suspect 
that entrepreneurial incentives lie at the core of the problem.  New 
Jersey and Delaware are exceptional in their entrepreneurship.  We 
do not tend to see similar behavior in other state and local situations 
where proponents suggest competitive regulatory solutions.  Given 
this, we find it odd to hear that the charter competition system is 
infirm because rents provide its incentives.  Absent the rents it is 
difficult to imagine the charter competition system ever coming into 
existence in the first place. 
Competition, then, does not provide a stand-alone justification 
for a strong internal affairs presumption.  But we do not think this 
makes for a federalism problem for Delaware.  To our knowledge, no 
first-best lawmaking equilibrium has ever been identified, so it is 
not clear to us why the charter market needs to be judged by that 
measure in the first place. 
C. Summary: The Stable Equilibrium 
The state system can be described as a stable equilibrium.  
Drawing on concepts from evolutionary game theory, we see that 
prior to 1920 New Jersey adopted a noncooperative strategy, turning 
corporate law making into a strategic game directed to the 
acquisition of rents from managers looking for responsive, enabling 
legal frameworks, despite negative consequences for other states.  
There followed a period of learning (or adaptive behavior) during 
which other states adjusted their strategies, following New Jersey.143  
New Jersey then abandoned its strategy for exogenous political 
reasons. Delaware, playing New Jersey’s original strategy, captured 
its rents. Delaware has been playing noncooperatively vis-à-vis the 
other states ever since.  Within the game, an enabling corporate 
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code that also vests agenda control over governance matters in 
management amounts to an evolutionary stable strategy—any state 
without one risks the loss of its significant charters;144 any state 
innovation that fails to follow the strategy will not succeed.  
Meanwhile, Delaware’s agents resemble rational maximizers, 
seeking to protect the state’s rents.  They update and learn on an 
ongoing basis, adjusting their strategies respecting the terms of 
corporate law as they face new situations.145  The history shows that 
so long as the states are left alone to play the game, corporate law 
nearly approaches a stationary state.146 
The state system and its stable equilibrium pose two questions 
for federal lawmakers.  The first is whether to respect the 
equilibrium’s exclusion of regulation referenced to the wider public 
interest.  Here a federal decision to intervene could so displace the 
states as to destroy the equilibrium and the strategies and rents 
that keep it stable.  The second question is whether the state 
equilibrium succeeds as shareholder capitalism, according the 
shareholders meaningful ultimate control and succeeding in 
directing management in the shareholders’ interest.  Here, views 
 
 144. Id. at 17. 
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differ on the probable state level effects of federal intervention.  
Some argue that the states’ failure to contain externalities and 
regulate toward the end of shareholder value maximization rebuts 
the internal affairs presumption and justifies corrective 
intervention.147  As we have seen, they also argue that this can be 
done in a way that forces the states to change their strategies, 
accommodating the shareholder interest and changing their 
strategy without cutting off the rent incentive.  Others take the 
position that the stable equilibrium holds out such benefits that any 
shortcomings must be forgiven.  They point out that the political 
agenda at the federal level is highly contestable.  Management 
remains a more concentrated group than the shareholders and thus 
more able to wield influence.  It could co-opt a federal reform 
process, for example procuring legislation making takeovers more 
expensive still.148  That risk, together with the possibility of perverse 
effects stemming from the federal habit of governance by mandate,149 
implies a preference for the states’ enabling equilibrium, with its 
high degree of accountability within the corporate community.150 
The corporate federalism question devolves into an assessment 
of the weight to be accorded these warnings.  To assist that 
appraisal, the next Part of this Article inquires into the political 
dynamics that trigger federal intervention into internal affairs.  It 
shows that the notions of the public interest that motivate national-
level regulators have over time synchronized better and better with 
the state equilibrium. 
II. POLITICAL ECONOMY AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL 
The federal government took the lead in regulating the 
securities markets when it added disclosure, antifraud, and insider 
trading mandates in 1933 and 1934.151  Under the internal affairs 
norm, as thereafter articulated, markets and disclosure were federal 
subject matters, while other corporate subject matters were 
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presumptively left to the states and the stable equilibrium.  Despite 
the norm, the federal government and the stock exchanges since 
that time have progressively, albeit episodically, entered into 
internal affairs.  These interventions are historically contingent, 
occurring when political demands are registered nationally.152 
Despite the contingent and episodic nature of these federal 
entries, federalism has evolved toward an equilibrium balance.  
Where the exchange of a product for rents describes the state 
equilibrium, the federal equilibrium is political. Where the state 
equilibrium is self-enforcing, federal actors have a range of 
strategies at their disposal and a zone of discretion.  They could play 
uncooperatively, intervening so as to terminate the rents and the 
state equilibrium.  They also could be wholly cooperative, leaving 
internal affairs to the states.  Strategies actually chosen depend on 
political norms and pressures, which in turn depend heavily on the 
environment in which the game is played.  We accordingly should 
not expect the federal-state game to replicate the stability we see in 
the states because the federal game is political and driven by 
exogenous events.  Even so, four patterns can be discerned in the 
history of federal incursions on internal affairs.  Together they 
suggest the evolution of a stable, cooperative strategy at the federal 
level. 
The first pattern concerns subject matter.  Interventions tend to 
address topics, legal compliance most prominently, as to which 
unilateral action by Delaware would be inadequate to fully satisfy 
national political demands.  This follows in part from the federal 
structure: national demands create a need for parallel action across 
all fifty states.  It also follows from the properties of the state 
equilibrium.  In the charter market, the evolutionarily stable 
strategy is fidelity to the management interest.  If Delaware shifted 
to a strategy of imposing hardwired accountability and enforcement, 
it would be viewed as a defection against management and would 
disrupt the equilibrium, reducing Delaware’s rents.  The same thing 
would happen if Delaware mandated governance processes.  It 
follows that not only does federal intervention accomplish results 
unavailable in the states, the stable equilibrium disables the states 
from preemptively anticipating federal strategies.  The states’ 
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evolutionarily stable strategy embeds the legal regime.  At the same 
time, because the federal government never makes full use of its 
constitutional preemptive authority, the federal-state equilibrium 
has a cooperative aspect. 
The second pattern concerns political substance.  Federal 
chartering, the public interest strategy holding out the greatest 
threat to the state equilibrium, never reached the top of the federal 
political agenda after 1920.  More generally, initiatives implicating 
sharp ideological partisanship do not find their way into federal-
level mandates.  Neither the trust paradigm (broadly or narrowly 
stated) nor the market paradigm has motivated national-level 
interventions.  But a third approach, which we call the “governance 
agenda,” does carry descriptive weight.  Under this approach, the 
federal government intervenes to adjust state equilibrium results for 
the benefit of the shareholders, largely restricting itself to 
governance instruments found on a self-regulatory menu.  The 
pattern implies a norm of cooperation. 
The third pattern concerns the relative influence of 
shareholders and managers.  The presence of the SEC hardwires an 
influential voice for the shareholder interest at the federal level, 
even as the management interest at times also proves influential.  
Either way, federal interventions are stock market sensitive, with 
shareholder-directed interventions coming in the wake of adverse 
economic shocks and management-directed interventions occurring 
during buoyant markets. 
The fourth pattern manifests the operative federalism.  Even as 
the federal government and the stock exchanges cross the internal 
affairs line and mandate governance strategies, they have never 
disrupted the state equilibrium.  National intervention has 
impacted neither the basic terms of the state settlement nor 
Delaware’s rent flows, once again implying a cooperative strategy.  
Contrariwise, even as federal moves have prompted Delaware to 
adjust its strategies on occasion, Delaware never goes so far as to 
imitate federal strategies. 
Part II.A looks at the counterfactual empty set, federal level 
agendas under the trust and market paradigms and the failure of 
both federal chartering and the protakeover agenda.  Part II.B looks 
at the political climate surrounding the two most prominent federal 
interventions into internal affairs since 1934, the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  Part II.C contrasts the 
political climate surrounding the Williams Act and other 
management directed federal interventions.  Part II.D summarizes. 
A. The Trust and Market Paradigms at the Federal Level 
Federal incorporation proposals antedate the federal 
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government itself—James Madison mooted the idea at the 
Constitutional Convention. 153   Federal incorporation went on to 
reach the top of the national policy agenda as a first reaction to the 
appearance of charter competition.  But its proponents in successive 
administrations never managed to put together the broad-based 
coalition needed to secure passage in Congress. 154   After 1920, 
federal chartering never regained comparable political salience, 
even as the trust paradigm’s adherents brought it back to the 
national agenda on two later occasions.  This section takes the 
benefit of hindsight to explain those later failures, drawing a 
parallel to the failure of the market paradigm’s proponents to invoke 
federal preemptive power to protect the hostile takeover. 
1. The New Deal 
Federal incorporation had a place on the agendas of a number of 
prominent New Dealers, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and SEC 
Chairman William O. Douglas not least among them.155  They were 
joined by Senators Joseph O’Mahoney and William Borah, who 
promoted the idea in Congress during the second Roosevelt 
administration.  O’Mahoney and Borah wanted to make federal 
incorporation the vehicle for an omnibus progressive assault on 
management discretion.  O’Mahoney’s proposed bill156 revived old 
antitrust agenda items, adding to them Berle and Means’ rule of 
trusteeship and other current items from the governance agenda.  
O’Mahoney also included the labor agenda, mandating compliance 
with the National Labor Relations Act as an internal corporate 
duty.157 
Unfortunately for O’Mahoney, prominent actors in the 
administration were opposed.  Even Douglas had other matters at 
the top of his agenda and in any event opposed the inclusion of 
antitrust and labor compliance.158  The best that O’Mahoney could 
get from Congress was the formation of a study committee, the 
Temporary National Economic Committee.159  This brought together 
six members of Congress and six agency representatives under 
O’Mahoney’s chair.160  The committee held hearings but never got 
behind O’Mahoney’s omnibus approach.  Its final report in 1941 had 
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no impact.161 
The bundling of the labor agenda has been accorded a causal 
role in the failure of the O’Mahoney initiative.162  To second the 
point, reference can be made to the labor movement’s congressional 
agenda since World War II, which has never targeted empowerment 
in corporate internal affairs.  Under an enduring American political 
settlement, labor works within the model of contractual 
engagement, where, since the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act in 
1947, 163  it has been fighting a rearguard political action. 164  
Organized labor works to improve its rights to organize shopfloors, 
empower the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) (or nominate 
a stronger enforcement agent), and secure the power of the 
secondary boycott.165  State law also shows up on the agenda, but 
labor wants right-to-work laws preempted rather than state 
corporate codes.166  Today, even as union pension funds use their 
shareholdings for antimanagerial initiatives, they tend to stick to 
items on the institutional investors’ governance agenda, avoiding 
labor movement issues in order to retain plausibility.167 
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2. The Watergate Era 
When federal chartering returned to the political stage in the 
1970s, labor figured in only incidentally.168  The antitrust agenda of 
the day also was separately pursued, resulting in the Hart-Scott-
Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976.169  Federal chartering 
proponents, who this time came from outside of government, 
pursued a more general notion of the “public interest.”  Social 
reformers like Ralph Nader linked the conduct of corporate business 
to a range of social problems.170  It was thought that the benign, 
pluralist vision of government had failed.  Legislative results were 
not protecting the public interest because business had 
overwhelming political influence.  Indeed, under a theory in 
circulation at the time, business did not even need to lobby 
aggressively to get results: politicians automatically backed 
anything that encouraged investment because they were terrified of 
the political consequences of disinvestment during economic 
downturns.171  The proponents sought to surmount the problems and 
enforce the public interest through legal control over internal 
affairs.  This public interest agenda came in from the fringe when 
news of improper political contributions and foreign payments made 
management’s conduct of business a national political issue in the 
post-Watergate environment.172 
But only a handful of legislative proposals materialized.  Three 
bills mandating federal chartering were introduced between 1972 
and 1980.173  Of these, the focal point initiative was Senator Howard 
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Metzenbaum’s Protection of Shareholders’ Rights Act of 1980,174 a 
bill that drew on the Berle and Means trust paradigm, omitting the 
broader public agenda and focusing on the shareholder interest and 
the governance agendas.  Following Cary, it imposed federal 
fiduciary standards,175 adding a series of process mandates including 
an independent director board majority,176 audit and nominating 
committees entirely made up of independent directors, 177  a 
shareholder nomination mechanism, 178  and cumulative voting. 179  
But time was running out for antimanagerial politics in 1980.  When 
the Reagan administration came in the following year, the federal 
agenda shifted to the market paradigm.  Federal chartering has not 
been heard of since on Capitol Hill. 
The trust paradigm did better in the federal courts of the era 
than it did in Congress.  Federal courts of appeal expanded the 
implied right of action under Rule 10b-5 to cover equitable fraud and 
breaches of fiduciary duty.180  Had the expansion been sustained, the 
states’ fiduciary regime might have been rendered superfluous as 
plaintiffs opted for a more hospitable federal venue.  But, in 1977, a 
Supreme Court majority rejected the expansive reading of 10b-5,181 
emphatically employing the internal affairs presumption in its 
interpretation of the securities laws.182 
3. The Takeover Era 
The political tables turned in 1980.  Now adherents of the 
market paradigm dominated the SEC.183  Although friends of the 
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internal affairs presumption, they soon ran into their own problems 
with the states.  The states, still following the evolutionary stable 
strategy, were moving to chill hostile takeovers.  The market 
paradigm supported preemptive intervention.  Although generally 
committed to regulatory devolution, the paradigm also counseled 
central regulatory intervention to the extent necessary to protect a 
market by keeping transactional lanes open and policing 
externalities.184  The paradigm’s adherents won a single great victory 
when the same Supreme Court that had protected the states from 
the federal antifraud regime invalidated first generation 
antitakeover statutes as a burden on interstate commerce. 185  
Unfortunately, the states took advantage of the Court’s interpretive 
preference for state control of internal affairs and redrafted their 
statutes, winning the second round in the Supreme Court.186  It 
accordingly was up to Congress to protect the market for corporate 
control.  Unfortunately, the takeover wars of the period left 
Congress inundated with antitakeover constituent pressure.  Most 
proposed bills were antitakeover.187  The interest group alignment in 
Washington tracked that in the states, with the management voice 
sounding louder than the shareholder voice and the shareholders 
showing no cognizable public support for preemptive intervention 
against the states.188  Administration opposition sufficed to block the 
antitakeover initiatives, 189  leaving the federal government in 
gridlock.  The outcome accordingly was decided at the state level. 
4. Summary 
Now comes the question as to what these accounts teach us 
about the content of corporate federalism.  More specifically, to what 
extent should we infer that the internal affairs norm played a causal 
role in these federal level outcomes?  Drawing causal inferences 
from a historical pattern of inaction is a risky business, so we take a 
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flexible approach in addressing the question.  Three contrasting 
inferences may be drawn. 
a. No Federalism.  Nothing in these cases compels the 
inference that federalism concerns played an operative role.  The 
events plausibly can be read narrowly, as a series of federal-level 
political failures acted out against an inherited state-level default 
condition.  Such a default persists so long as the actors at the higher 
level of government fail to agree, and can persist even though the 
terms of state regulation no longer embody a preferred outcome due 
to changed conditions.190  No inference of respect for the states need 
be drawn.  O’Mahoney acted at the moment in history when 
intervention against the states and corporate management had a 
comparatively high level of political plausibility.  But he asked for 
too much in challenging the political settlement that excludes labor 
from internal affairs, a settlement long embedded at both the 
national and state levels.  Metzenbaum asked for less, but taking 
advantage of hindsight, we can see that in 1980 the trust paradigm 
did not command a political base adequate to push business law 
reform past the management interest and into law.  (The Reagan 
SEC and the market paradigm encountered the same problem a few 
years later.)  Indeed, by 1980 the trust paradigm probably lacked 
the political gravitas to reach the top of the congressional agenda, 
much less to defeat the opposing interest group. 
Both the trust and the market paradigms emerge in this 
description as political failures.  Whatever their substantive merits, 
they were the projects of narrow networks of academic and policy 
elites.  Neither resounded strongly enough, either with the median 
voter, or alternatively, the partisan agenda setters, to stay (or even 
arrive) at the top of the agenda, much less to override interest group 
opposition.191  No general observation about the political influence of 
narrow, elite networks is intended.  Academic paradigms help shape 
political agendas, perhaps even contributing a focal-point solution in 
a case where a problem has multiple competing solutions.192  But the 
likelihood of such influence decreases as the distributional 
consequences of the competing outcomes increase.193  Here, given the 
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high stakes, it is unsurprising that the politics failed to work out for 
the proponents. 
Significantly, both paradigms did better in the courts.  There, 
given interpretive slack, network members in positions of authority 
can find room to maneuver.  At the same time, the judicial rulings 
show us the only points in the sequence of events implying that 
respect for the states operates as an independent and causative 
value.  There may have been members of the CTS Court who 
preferred the market for corporate control and economic federalism 
as a policy proposition but who also felt bound by a conflicting 
juridical tradition of reserve, here bound up in the internal affairs 
notion.194 
b. Parallel Politics.  Alternatively, we can read these events 
as a product of parallel normative views at the state and federal 
levels.  On this view, no federal intervention occurred because actors 
controlling federal outcomes saw nothing amiss in state corporate 
law.  This view can be restated in public choice form: whether or not 
most federal actors approved of state results, the federal interest 
group gestalt paralleled that of the states,195 with the management 
interest proving sufficiently dominant to protect the state regime.  
An astute federal actor would anticipate an all out interest group 
assault on any legislation that threatened the state equilibrium.  
Management and related interest groups like the corporate bar and 
the financial intermediaries have a significant investment in 
Delaware law.  Quite apart from any policy preferences, such 
investors can be expected to fight (or pay) to protect the yield from 
their sunk costs,196 and federal politicians can be expected to settle 
in their favor, perhaps exacting tribute. 
c. Federalism.  Finally, it remains possible that independent 
federalism considerations operated to deter federal intervention.  
The operative federalism notions could have been either juridical or 
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economic.  We prefer an economic reading.  The next sections of this 
Part look at a number of high profile cases where Congress did cross 
the internal affairs line, suggesting that any barrier posed by 
constitutional traditions yields easily.  As to economic notions of 
federalism, a different inference arises.  None of these incursions on 
internal affairs have disrupted the state equilibrium, permitting an 
inference of respect for state control over internal affairs, viewed 
from an economic perspective. 
B. Federal Incursions on Internal Affairs Under the Governance 
Agenda 
In 1934, William O. Douglas, then still a Yale law professor, 
published an article in the Harvard Law Review in which he 
described the shortcomings of the about-to-be enacted federal 
securities statute.197  He noted scandals that had come to light in the 
aftermath of the great crash, variously involving secret loans, 
undisclosed profit sharing plans, self-dealing contracts, and insider 
trading.198  Disclosure would not be enough, he said, more in the way 
of regulation was needed to prevent the repeat of such sorry 
spectacles in the next cyclical market rise.199  The problem, said 
Douglas, lay in the separation of ownership and control.200  Taking 
care to endorse the trust paradigm,201 he nevertheless articulated a 
second agenda.  Control of the board of directors needed to be taken 
out of management’s hands and placed in those of an independent 
director majority.  He proposed a monitoring model—a board made 
up of independent shareholder representatives who supervised from 
a position of power.202  Douglas also wanted more disclosure of 
conflict of interest transactions and maybe even a per se prohibition 
of loans to officers.203  Finally, Douglas noted that the present legal 
structure did little to move corporate governance in the direction 
indicated.  He was flexible about means to the end of improvement.  
Any of federal incorporation, self-help by the shareholders (given a 
federally instituted organizational base on which to solve collective 
action problems), or improvement of state law might move things in 
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the right direction.204 
Douglas’ article set out the basic terms of the governance 
agenda that has guided corporate law reform ever since.205  Where 
both the trust and the market paradigms have failed, this academic 
paradigm has influenced both actors in the corporate sector and 
federal legislators.  Significantly, the agenda is narrow, viewed in 
the broad scale of things, addressing only the management-
shareholder relationship and eschewing other constituents and 
unrelated notions of the public interest.  It has two branches.  The 
first branch goes to the board of directors’ make-up and institutional 
role.  Here, two categories of questions come up.  The first goes to 
the identification of best corporate governance practices.  The second 
concerns whether a best practice, once identified, should be 
mandated, overriding the enabling state system.  The agenda’s 
second branch concerns compliance with law.  This branch in part 
tracks state corporate law, looking to enforcement of fiduciary 
duties.  But the compliance agenda has an independent federal side 
tied to the federal antifraud enforcement regime.  This will be the 
point of entry against state control of internal affairs. 
The rest of this Part II.B recounts the appearance of the two 
statutes that do most to carry the governance agenda across the 
internal affairs barrier, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 
(“FCPA”)206 and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”).207  We will 
see that the Congress traverses internal affairs on a fire patrol 
basis.208  In both cases, a bipartisan Congress acted in response to an 
external shock.  In both cases, the state equilibrium precluded 
significant corrective action.  In both cases, corporate compliance 
failures triggered broad-based political demands.  And in both cases, 
the federal compliance regime reached more deeply into internal 
affairs. 
1. The Watergate Era 
During the Watergate investigations of 1973-74, the special 
prosecutor discovered corporate political slush funds that evaded 
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normal accounting controls.209  Payments included illegal domestic 
political contributions and bribes to officials abroad—termed 
“questionable foreign payments”—made in connection with the sale 
of American goods and services. 210   In March 1974, the SEC 
announced a voluntary disclosure program, asking companies to 
admit to any questionable payments to foreign officials.211  There 
resulted admissions by over 450 companies implicating over $400 
million in payments. 212   The public, already disgusted with 
corruption in government and agitated by the media, demanded a 
clean up of corruption in corporate America. 213   Corporate 
governance became bound up with the politics of corruption in high 
places.214 
The SEC responded in 1977, taking up governance agenda 
items looking toward majority independent boards and committees.  
It held public hearings.  But, unfortunately, the SEC had no 
statutory authorization to mandate committee structure.  Aside 
from section 14 of the 1934 Act,215 which authorizes the SEC proxy 
rules, the agency could only mandate disclosure.  So the SEC 
worked the agenda into new disclosure rules concerning board and 
committee membership and structure.  It wanted each director 
tagged as independent or affiliated.  Management, however, made 
its voice heard and the SEC had to settle for less direct means of 
getting pertinent facts into the public filings.216  Movement toward 
board and committee process mandates shifted over to the American 
Law Institute (“ALI”), which was taking up a corporate governance 
project.  But management was so averse to mandates that it raised 
its voice at the ALI as well, stifling even a mandatory statement 
encapsulated in a nonbinding principle.217  Efficiency worries had 
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come to the fore in the stagflating economy.  The governance agenda 
was remitted to the less threatening venue of self-regulation, where 
it prospered. 
But a handful of mandates were forthcoming.  The SEC 
pressured the NYSE to amend its rules to require an audit 
committee comprised solely of independent directors.218  Putting the 
proxy rules to one side, this amounted to the first national-level 
mandatory push into internal affairs pursuant to the governance 
agenda. 
Additional mandates came with the FCPA, which prohibited 
bribery of foreign officials, making the “questionable” payments 
illegal.  More importantly for present purposes, it amended the 1934 
Act to go deeply into internal affairs, imposing record-keeping and 
internal-control requirements on reporting firms.219  The FCPA also 
gave the SEC oversight over the formulation of accounting 
principles. 220   It was said to amount to the most extensive 
application of federal law to the regulation of corporations since 
1934.221 
The FCPA’s mandates would have been inconceivable in the 
state law framework.  The stable equilibrium, with its enabling 
approach, excluded them.  Compliance systems were not even on the 
states’ formal enabling menu.  In theory compliance with the law fell 
within the regime of fiduciary review; in practice there was no 
enforcement commitment.222 
The FCPA grew out of a presidential investigation and spate of 
committee hearings conducted in 1976, an election year.223  There 
was significant political disagreement.  The Ford Administration 
backed a disclosure-based statute; Democratic senators and their 
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 219. See Walter Perkel, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
683, 683 (2003). 
 220. Id.  
 221. See GREANIAS & WINDSOR, supra note 209, at 1. 
 222. The classic citation is Graham v. Allis Chalmers, 188 A.2d 125, 129-30 
(Del. 1963) (declining duty of care review of antitrust compliance breakdown).  
See generally Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Compliance with the Law in the 
Era of Efficiency, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1265, 1384 (1998). 
 223. GREANIAS & WINDSOR, supra note 209, at 1. 
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presidential candidate, Governor Jimmy Carter, wanted directives 
and criminal penalties.  The Senate unanimously passed a weak bill 
before the election, but the House recessed before taking up the 
matter.224  When the new Congress convened in 1977, Carter had 
won and the new administration backed a strong bill.  The strong 
version passed unanimously by the end of the year.225  As Figure IV 
shows, the scandals unfolded against the backdrop of a volatile stock 
market in which long-term investors made no money.  The market 
crashed during the Nixon-Ford administrations to recover in the 
run-up to the 1976 election.226  But, given the high inflation of the 
period, the recovery did not make whole the losses.  As Congress 
finally took up the FCPA in 1977, the market again stumbled 
badly.227 
 
Figure IV: Market Context 1972-78 
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 224. Id. at 60-65. 
 225. Id. at 63, 71; Daniel L. Goelzer, The Accounting Provisions of the 
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 226. GREANIAS & WINDSOR, supra note 209, at 1.  
 227. Id. at 59-74. 
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norm.  The result was SOX.228 
SOX had a quick gestation.  The Enron scandal and 
accompanying media frenzy began with news of paper shredding in 
January 2002.  The House enacted its bill in April, by a vote of 334 
to 80.229  WorldCom fell while the Senate held hearings on the House 
bill, triggering an accelerated timetable and passage by voice vote on 
July 15.230  The Conference Report, passage by both Houses, and 
presidential approval all followed before the end of the month.231  
The Republicans disliked many provisions, but with an election 
coming up and a falling stock market (coming on the heels of a 
precipitous plummet two years earlier), they fell in line.  Even the 
leading business lobbies were split, with the Business Roundtable 
saying yes and the Chamber of Commerce saying no.232  So rapidly 
was the package cobbled together that little of its contents received 
much in the way of considered attention.233 
 
 228. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified 
in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C. (2000)). 
 229. See Report on Public Law 107-204, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d107:HR03763:@@@R (last visited August 30, 2006). 
 230. Id.  
 231. See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack 
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1600-02 (2005). 
 232. Id. at 112. 
 233. Id. at 111, 125.  Mark J. Roe, Backlash, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 217 (1998), 
is the leading discussion of the politics that follow upon economic adversity.  On 
the recent scandals, see Joseph A. Grundfest, Punctuated Equilibria in the 
Evolution of United States Securities Regulation, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 1 
(2002) (analogizing the development of the securities laws to the “punctuated 
equilibrium” theory of evolution in which “species are relatively stable over long 
periods of time, but ‘events of rapid speciation occasionally punctuate this 
tranquility’”); Kai-Alexander Heeren & Oliver Rieckers, Legislative Responses 
in Times of Financial Crisis – New Deal Securities Legislation, Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act and Their Impact on Future German and EU Regulation, 14 EUR. BUS. L. 
REV. 595, 623 (2003) (arguing that Sarbanes-Oxley’s purpose was to calm 
investors by demonstrating congressional activism); Vikramaditya S. Khanna, 
Corporate Crime Legislation: A Political Economy Analysis, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 
95, 105 (2004) (describing corporate crime legislation as normally coming after 
a public outcry for greater regulation following revelations of corporate 
wrongdoing, usually during a weak economy).  Gregory Mark offers a 
contrasting description, distinguishing between the economic downturn and the 
scandals and putting causal emphasis on the former.  See Gregory A. Mark, The 
Legal History of Corporate Scandal: Some Observations on the Ancestry and 
Significance of the Enron Era, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1073, 1086 (2003) (suggesting 
that corporate reforms since the Great Depression have been ill-conceived). 
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Figure V: Market Context 1999-2002 
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new audit oversight board instituted by the statute tracks 
regulatory templates already established for regulation of securities 
market professionals. 
Federally speaking, SOX shocks in requiring audit committees 
composed entirely of independent directors, defining “independent 
director,” laying down audit committee duties and powers, and 
requiring disclosure respecting the expert status of committee 
members.239  The shock does not follow from the regulation’s terms.  
The committee-based governance agenda dates back to Douglas.240  
The same goes for the other headline internal affairs item in SOX—
the ban on corporate loans to officers and directors. 241   When 
Douglas mentioned this ban in 1934,242 he was only restating a 
suggestion made many times in the early decades of the twentieth 
century.243  SOX, then, is an ideal manifestation of Kingdon’s model 
of a law reform idea that sits at the bottom of agenda for decades, 
waiting for a window of political opportunity to open and a 
normative entrepreneur to put it at the right spot on the agenda at 
that time.244 
It also can be noted that SOX’s transformation of self-regulatory 
process devices into mandates implies little in the way of real-world 
institutional adjustment.  Most large firms were organized with 
audit committees and compliance systems already, reflecting the 
influence of decades of self-regulatory conversations about best-
governance practices.  National-level audit committee mandates 
date from the Watergate era, albeit through the medium of 
exchange-listing requirements.  Indeed, amendments to NYSE 
listing requirements mooted in 2002 and approved in 2004 track the 
SOX audit committee provisions and extend them to the 
compensation and nominating committees before going on to the 
final redoubt of the boardroom to mandate a majority-independent 
board.245  The stock exchange remains the primary source of new 
mandates from the governance agenda. 
The Congress’s off-handed but emphatic revision of the internal 
 
65 Fed. Reg. 76,008-01 (2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 210.2-01, 240.14e-101 
(2006)). 
 239. Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 301, 407. 
 240. See supra notes 197-204 and accompanying text.  
 241. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 402(a). 
 242. See Jayne W. Barnard, Corporate Loans to Directors and Officers: Every 
Business Now a Bank?, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 237, 241-42. 
 243. See supra notes 197-204 and accompanying text. 
 244. JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 216 
(1984).  See generally Romano, supra note 231. 
 245. See NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A (2003), available at 
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/finalcorpgovrules.pdf. 
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affairs line drawn after 1934 does upset settled expectations.246  The 
present question is whether it implies anything further for corporate 
federalism.  In addressing this question, we put standard cost-
benefit criticisms of SOX off to one side247 to look at the political 
pattern.  FCPA and SOX have sufficient similarities to suggest a 
template for federal traversals of internal affairs.  First, both 
statutes respond to compliance failures by pushing federal 
regulation past the end product, the reports themselves, to the 
generative processes.  Both concern compliance with law (or in the 
case of “questionable payments,” quasi law), and respond to political 
demands appearing in the wake of high-profile noncompliance.  In 
both cases, the political demands could not have been satisfied at 
the state level, partly due to dispersion of response across fifty 
states and partly due to the stable equilibrium.  Meanwhile, in both 
cases, the political demand stemmed from the general public, rather 
than from organized interest groups.  (We think that the interest 
groups benefited, lawyers and accountants primarily, amount to 
incidental beneficiaries rather than prime movers.)  Both statutes 
draw on a nonideological source, the governance agenda, and 
surmounted partisan politics in the course of their enactment.  
Finally, neither statute appears to have disturbed the state 
equilibrium.  Isolated mandates from the governance agenda do not 
amount to external shocks that force strategies to change at the 
state level.  They apply across the board, putting no competitive 
pressure on Delaware.  Because they supplement the states’ 
enabling framework, no state-level adjustment is necessary.  It is 
management that has to adjust.  Congress intervenes against 
management, not Delaware. 
SOX also demonstrates the political implications of the rise of 
the shareholder class.248  As the shareholder class rises, sharp stock 
market reverses and concomitant corporate misdeeds are more 
likely to hold out national political ramifications.  Significantly, 
federalism concerns did show up prominently in the history of the 
FCPA—the Ford administration wanted to respect the post-1934 
internal affairs boundary.  But with SOX twenty-five years later, 
federalism concerns did nothing to deter either the Congress or the 
 
 246. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Creeping Federalization of 
Corporate Law, 26 REG. 26, 26-31 (2003). 
 247. The complaint is that SOX raises compliance costs more than more 
compliance benefits firms and shareholders.  In particular, the costs bear more 
heavily on a marginal class of firms that will be discouraged from going public 
or, if already public, might be forced to go private.  In addition, foreign listings 
may be deterred. 
 248. For a description, see Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End 
of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 452-53 (2001). 
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Republican administration.  The political demands, or at least 
Washington’s perception of them, seem to have materially increased 
in magnitude.  So, to the extent Delaware’s management customers 
continue to behave badly, it can expect the zone of federal mandate 
to continue to expand.  When this happens Delaware should blame 
its customers rather than the Congress, which is only responding to 
highly representative politics. 
Delaware does run a risk here.  Future cumulative SOX-type 
mandates could so hardwire governance processes that firms decide 
that the choice of state of incorporation is irrelevant and stop paying 
Delaware’s premium price.  This seems a low-probability 
contingency, however.  Although the enabling code is a core 
component of the state equilibrium, it is not something Delaware 
sells today.  Most of the state codes converged on key equilibrium 
terms decades ago. 
C. Federal Incursions on Internal Affairs at Management’s Request 
We complete the post-1934 description of federal traversal of 
state territory with reference to three interventions originating in 
management demands.  The Williams Act of 1968,249 the National 
Securities Markets Improvements Act of 1996 (“NSMIA”),250 and the 
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (“SLUSA”).251  
All three pieces of legislation stem from management dissatisfaction 
with the state system.  All three were enacted in rising stock 
markets.  None of the three disturbed the charter market 
equilibrium, with which management presumably had no 
dissatisfaction. 
1. The Williams Act 
The Williams Act imposes, inter alia, disclosure and process 
constraints on tender offerors and target companies.  It modifies 
what previously had been a state-law zone of free contract between 
arm’s length buyers and sellers of shares.  The Act reduces the 
contracting space with process constraints on the conduct of tender 
offers.  It should be described as management protective: its 
minimum duration period strengthens the hand of target 
management, importing a window of opportunity in which to employ 
 
 249. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-
(e), 78n(d)-(f) (2000)). 
 250. Pub. L. No. 104-290, 112  Stat. 3416 (1996) (codified in scattered 
sections of 15 U.S.C. (2000)). 
 251. Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998) (codified in scattered 
sections of 15 U.S.C. (2000)). 
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defensive tactics.252 
The Act stemmed from concern over the increasing impact of 
“corporate raiders,” and was conceived as a device to curb cash 
tender offers. 253   Senator Harrison Williams introduced the 
legislation in 1965, 254  making clear his management-protective 
motive, speaking of “white collar pirates” who took advantage of the 
“leniency of our laws” to loot “proud old companies.” 255   But 
Williams’s pro-management draft failed to attract support from the 
SEC and therefore failed to gain traction in the Senate.256  Then, as 
later, views on takeovers conflicted. 
Williams tried again in 1967, with a less stringent draft.257  This 
time he emphasized that the bill was not meant to discourage tender 
offers per se.  Reflecting the view of SEC Chairman Cohen,258 
Williams assured that the bill was neutral towards both bidders and 
targets.259  In this case narrow policy networks had an impact: the 
final Act’s modest compass stemmed in no small part from 
suggestions of the securities industry and academics, who took the 
bidder’s part.260  With support secured from the SEC261 and the stock 
exchanges, the bill passed easily, by a series of voice votes.262 
 
 252. David D. Haddock, et al., Property Rights in Assets and Resistance to 
Tender Offers, 73 VA. L. REV. 701, 741 (1987); see also Jonathan R. Macey & 
Jeffry M. Netter, Regulation 13D and the Regulatory Process, 65 WASH. U. L.Q. 
131, 157-58 (1987) (arguing that rules requiring disclosure of bidders’ intentions 
serve no public interest, benefiting lawyers, accountants, and investment 
bankers in addition to defending managers). 
 253. See Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Misreading the Williams Act, 87 
MICH. L. REV. 1862, 1891 (1989). 
 254. Id. 
 255. RALPH C. FERRARA ET AL., TAKEOVERS II: A STRATEGIST’S MANUAL FOR 
BUSINESS COMBINATIONS IN THE 1990S 8 (2d ed. 1993). 
 256. Johnson & Millon, supra note 253, at 1891. 
 257. The Williams Act, as eventually passed, had reduced proration periods 
and limited withdrawal periods compared to those initially considered.  See 
Note, SEC Tender Offer Timing Rules: Upsetting a Congressionally Selected 
Balance, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 914, 925 (1983); see also Johnson & Millon, supra 
note 253, at 1893 (describing the Act as a compromise between pro and 
antitakeover views). 
 258. Note, supra note 257, at 925. 
 259. See Allen E. Kelinsky, Comment, Tender Offers: Promoting Shareholder 
Equality in Stock Accumulation Programs for Corporate Control, 36 AM. U. L. 
REV. 93, 94-95 (1986). 
 260. See Johnson & Millon, supra note 253, at 1897; Note, supra note 257, at 
926-27. 
 261. The SEC broadly accepted the Williams Act as passed due to its desire 
for a bill that neither favored nor disfavored corporate takeover activity through 
tender offers.  See Richard W. Stevenson, Securities Bill Emerges in House as 
G.O.P. Drops Some Demands, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1996, at D1. 
 262. See 113 Cong. Rec. 24,664 (1967); 114 Cong. Rec. 21,483-84 (1968); 114 
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Figure VI: Market Context 1964-68 263 
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 264. 15 U.S.C. § 77r (2000). 
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 266. 15 U.S.C. § 77r (2000). 
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Figure VII: Market Context 1994-98267 
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bill limited both state-level class actions and fraud actions based on 
state law.275 
In 1997, the bill was reported out on a bipartisan basis in both 
the House and the Senate.  SEC Chair Arthur Levitt and Senator 
Paul Sarbanes both voiced opposition at hearings, and the matter 
stalled for a few months.276  In 1998, the legislation moved forward 
with renewed vigor, due in no small part to the steadily rising stock 
market and the increasing political muscle of Silicon Valley.277  
High-tech companies and other corporations interested in pursuing 
the new legislation created a lobbying group for the occasion,278 
which was joined by the National Venture Capital Association, the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, and the 
American Electronics Association. 279   Several organizations, 
including some consumer groups and organizations representing 
state and local governments, lobbied against the bill, but they lacked 
the political muscle of their opponents.280   But then, the stock 
market was going through the roof, as Figure VII attests.281 
Silicon Valley got what it wanted.  Levitt and President Clinton 
dropped their opposition in exchange for legislative history making 
it clear that no prohibition of federal suits for recklessness was 
intended.282  Although there were significant numbers of dissenters 
in both houses, the bill went through with strong majorities.  But 
before passage, a Delaware-oriented carve-out was added in the 
Senate, assuring that state litigation with respect to breach of 
fiduciary duty would be unaffected.283 
 
 275. Delaware was not a target: under prevailing conflict of laws rules, the 
fraud actions are not decided under the law of the state of incorporation.  See 
Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities 
Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2402-12 (1998). 
 276. In mid-1997 there were many who questioned the need for a uniform 
standards act for securities litigation.  In hearings, SEC Chair Levitt declared 
that it was still too early to assess whether or not a uniform act was needed; 
several senators, led by Senator Sarbanes, agreed with this assessment.  See 
Eugene P. Caiola, Comment, Retroactive Legislative History: Scienter Under the 
Uniform Security Litigation Standards Act of 1998, 64 ALB. L. REV. 309, 337 
(2000).  The SLUSA thereafter stalled due to a lack of support.  Id. at 340. 
 277. See Leslie Eaton, The Silicon Valley Gang: An Influential Industry with 
Lots of Money Is Getting Its Way on Capitol Hill, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1998, at 
D1. 
 278. Matthew Greco, Pre-emptive Legislation Expected Soon, INVESTOR REL. 
BUS., May 5, 1997. 
 279. Painter, supra note 274, at 49. 
 280. Id. at 50. 
 281. Figure VII, supra at note 267. 
 282. Painter, supra note 274, at 7, 53. 
 283. Id. at 56. 
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D. Summary 
Douglas astutely predicted in 1934 that scandals stemming 
from management shenanigans in bull markets were going to 
remain a problem.284  The FCPA and SOX fulfilled the prediction, 
both responding to political demands for management accountability 
in the wake of scandals.  In the case of the FCPA, the public 
responded to the scandal in the mode of the trust paradigm, casting 
managers as public actors.  Power meant responsibility.  Corruption 
was unacceptable, even corruption in pursuit of shareholder value.  
With the public proving willing to pay for ethical behavior, 285 
Congress moved to impose responsibility in law.  In contrast, Enron, 
WorldCom, and SOX were shareholder-value centered.  Managers 
whose stocks had collapsed had failed to comply with law, with the 
compliance failure bound up with the losses of many investors.  
Congress felt compelled to toughen the compliance regime. 
The broad-based political demands that led to FCPA and SOX 
occur only rarely.  For the public to have an opinion, it first has to be 
informed and then has to deliberate. 286   This rarely occurs on 
corporate governance matters, particularly so as to register political 
demands so strong as to surmount ideological divisions.287  Retail 
investors, viewed as an interest group, have little political 
influence.288  But well-publicized corruption and noncompliance raise 
the specter of a median voter interest289 in corporate matters and 
thereby bring about the exceptional case.  Stock market reverses 
also figure in.  When stocks are rising, people tend not to worry 
about compliance and politicians are loath to rock the boat.  Given 
 
 284. Douglas, Directors, supra note 197, at 1306. 
 285. See Andrei Shleifer, Does Competition Destroy Ethical Behavior?, 94 
AM. ECON. REV. 414, 418 (2004) (papers & proceedings) (noting that as societies 
grow rich they prove more willing to pay for ethical behavior through 
enforcement). 
 286. SMITH, supra note 165, at 28. 
 287. FCPA and SOX thus can be distinguished from what Smith terms 
“unifying issues”—issues that unite all business interests.  According to Smith, 
as to such issues, ideological divisions matter and partisan politics make the 
issues visible.  SMITH, supra note 165, at 25-26.  Success on such issues 
correlates with national political shifts, with business doing better in the early 
1950s, the early 1980s, and the mid-1990s.  Id. at 85. 
 288. See Donald C. Langevoort, Structuring Securities Regulation in the 
European Union: Lessons from the U.S. Experience 10-11 (European Corporate 
Governance Inst., working paper No. 41/2005, 2005). 
 289. One-third of American voters now describe themselves as “investors,” 
and national politicians now cater to the so-called “investor class.”  See Richard 
S. Dunham & Ann Therese, Just Who’s in the ‘Investor Class’?: A Third of the 
Country, and Growing.  No Wonder Bush is Wooding Them so Ardently, BUS. 
WK., Sept. 6, 2004, at 42-43. 
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market volatility due to noise trading and a widening pattern of 
equity investment, we can expect to see more such national political 
demands in the wake of compliance breakdowns. 
FCPA and SOX reflect a cooperative strategy as they respond to 
the demands.  Neither significantly disrupts the post-1934 division 
of subject matter between national and state levels.  They do 
traverse internal affairs.  But they do so largely toward the end of 
strengthening compliance with law, and the law in question, for the 
most part, is federal.  The entries onto state territory occur as 
incidents to the federal government’s maintenance of the integrity of 
its own system, and the federal system in the first instance remains 
directed to the national securities marketplace.  Nor do the FCPA 
and SOX appear to have disrupted the state-level equilibrium.  
Viewed from an economic perspective, then, they substantially 
respect the state system.  The issue with SOX is not federalism but 
costs and benefits at the national level. 
Even when SOX breaks a historic federal-state subject-matter 
pattern with its audit committee mandate, it only tracks more 
extensive mandatory interventions coming from the stock exchange 
acting independently.  Only the per se rule on loans to officers 
arguably takes SOX outside the national level box onto state 
fiduciary territory.  But, in fact, executive compensation has always 
been a federal topic, with a strong interest in the matter reflected in 
the insider-trading regime.  In any event, federalization of conflict-
of-interest transactions has a long way to go before it materially 
impacts the states.  There is no risk of that happening in the present 
context.  Indeed, with SLUSA, we saw the Congress take special 
care to avoid impairment of Delaware’s litigation business.  With 
FCPA and SOX, the loser is not Delaware, but management, which 
loses freedom of action in the shift from enabling to mandatory.290 
We conclude, then, that FCPA and SOX do not significantly 
violate or reconstitute prevailing federalism norms.  Instead, they 
follow from a political equilibrium within which federal and state 
regulatory authority has been allocated for more than a century.  
Recall that, under the state equilibrium, corporate law responds 
directly to the demands of corporate principals and agents acting 
within their corporate capacities, with the system positioning the 
dominant chartering state’s law to apply across the wider national 
political and economic geography.  The equilibrium holds out a 
possibility of externalities, particularly to the extent that agent 
demands register more loudly than those of the principals.  The 
states’ stable strategy also makes them unresponsive when national 
political demands concerning compliance arise in the wake of 
 
 290. Whether the shareholders won or lost is an open cost-benefit question. 
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external shocks.  Any response must be national. 
If Delaware were to shift strategies and compete with the SEC 
in taking the shareholders’ part on matters such as voting rights 
and rights of initiative, the shift would be viewed as a defection 
against the management interest and would disrupt the 
equilibrium.  The same is true of the public interest in compliance 
with law.  Delaware has never and cannot take the public’s part on 
matters of executive compliance with law and ex post punishment.  
Delaware does not criminalize; it neither jails nor fines.  We do get 
rhetoric from Delaware on the importance of compliance.291  But we 
have not seen Delaware apply its duty of care so that directors of 
firms with compliance breakdowns are required to pay money 
judgments.  We are highly unlikely ever to do so.  There is no 
strategy available to Delaware that lets it protect its interest in 
subject-matter territory by anticipating federal intervention and 
addressing and defusing the federal concern.292 
FCPA and SOX show us the federal strategy followed when 
political demands flow against management.  The Williams Act, 
NSMIA, and SLUSA show us a different class of federal play, the 
play that follows from the same sort of influence activity that 
determines results in the states.  Here, the general public has no 
knowledge of, and hence no opinion on, the subject matter.  The 
issues are what Mark Smith calls particularistic, that is, reflecting 
the interests of one business interest group, or conflictual, that is, 
triggering a difference of opinion within the business community.293  
Here, Democratic and Republican positions often blend into one 
another and elective politics have no direct bearing.294  Interest 
group influence tends to register more directly, giving management 
the same advantage at the federal level that it enjoys in the states.  
As at the state level, such management political operations tend to 
succeed against the backdrop of strong stock markets.  But the 
federal-state political overlap is not complete.  The difference lies in 
the SEC, which skews the federal agenda to weight the shareholder 
interest more heavily than the shareholder interest is or could be 
 
 291. See In re Caremark Int’l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967-70 
(Del. Ch. 1996). 
 292. The embeddedness point can be restated in terms of vetoes.  In 
Delaware, management, along with the state bar, acts as a veto player.  The 
larger the number of veto players in a lawmaking institution, the more policy 
becomes locked in and the more serious the status quo bias in the face of 
adverse shocks.  Nouriel Roubini & Jeffrey D. Sachs, Political and Economic 
Determinants of Budget Deficits in the Industrial Democracies, 33 EUR. ECON. 
REV. 903 (1989). 
 293. SMITH, supra note 165, at 21. 
 294. Id. at 24, 31. 
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weighted at the state level under the stable equilibrium.295 
III. DELAWARE 
Delaware’s competitive position gets stronger all the time.  We 
have seen that its market share has increased steadily since its 1967 
code revision.  Delaware has done equally well by other measures.  
Major reincorporations to Delaware peaked at the height of the 
takeover wars of the 1980s, with fifty-six in 1987.296  The numbers 
fell thereafter, but remained steady—there were 208 
reincorporations between 1991 and 2001. 297   In 1983, the total 
number of firms chartered in Delaware was 153,044; in 1990, the 
figure was 202,893, and by 2000, the figure had grown to 322,971 to 
fall off slightly in the recession years that followed.298  Table I shows 
that revenues from franchise taxes and corporation fees, taken as a 
percentage of all state revenues, a historically volatile figure, 
regained the twenty percent level in 1992 and hovered around 
twenty percent ever since. 
 
Table I: Revenues from Franchise Taxes and Corporation 
Fees as a Percent of all Revenues in Delaware299 
 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
  16.2%   15.3%  17.3%  14.4%   13.0%   12.1%   12.2%   12.2%   12.2% 
         
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
11.9% 12.0% 13.7% 14.8% 15.7% 17.6% 17.4% 17.1% 17.5% 
         
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
22.9% 21.3% 20.8% 20.4% 21.0% 21.8% 21.1% 21.2% 22.8% 
         
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005     
24.9% 22.1% 20.0% 20.8% 19.6%     
 
 
 295. See Langevoort, supra note 288, at 10-12, 14 (describing the culture of 
the SEC and rejecting a regulatory capture description). 
 296. Demetrios G. Kaouris, Note, Is Delaware Still a Haven for 
Incorporation?, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 965, 1012 tbl.1 (1995). 
 297. Guhan Subramanian, The Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on 
Incorporation Choice: Evidence on the “Race” Debate and Antitakeover 
Overreaching, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1795, 1821 tbl.1 (2002). 
 298. Email from Richard J. Geisenberger, Assistant Secretary of State, State 
of Delaware to author (June 25, 2004) (on file with author). 
 299. Id.  Table 1 picks up where the figures in NADER, ET AL., supra note 19, 
at 535 tbl.2, leave off, bringing the data to date. 
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In this Part we look at Delaware’s evolution in the wake of the 
federal incorporation threat of the 1970s and the takeover wars of 
the 1980s, both of which destabilized the state equilibrium.  
Delaware’s courts emerge as model strategic players.  Given a threat 
from a federal or state opponent, they pause between plays for 
rational introspection and adjust their strategies for future rounds 
of play.  Even as they adjust, they tend to do everything possible to 
leave the state equilibrium undisturbed.  In only one case do we see 
the judges experiment with a strategy that turns out to be 
inconsistent with management’s equilibrium expectations.  The 
courts then learn from the mistake, successfully remaking 
Delaware’s profile in an era obsessed with law compliance by 
empowered actors. 
In Part III.A, we show how Delaware’s bench dealt with the 
federal incorporation threat by taking fiduciary law more seriously.  
In so doing it experimented with and then rejected the trust 
paradigm, with its template of fairness review.  Drawing on the 
governance agenda to substitute process scrutiny, the Delaware 
courts reinvented corporate fiduciary law.  Their new strategy 
makes fiduciary review compatible with the management’s 
preference for a self-regulatory approach.  At the same time, 
Delaware’s judges have emerged as leaders in ongoing discussions 
about corporate best practices, strengthening the state’s tie to its 
corporate constituents.  Delaware emerges as a national leader, the 
good corporate cop that contrasts with the federal bad cop.  It should 
follow, in the event of an external economic or political shock that 
triggers questions about the charter system, that Delaware has a 
powerful base of support in Washington.  As a result, the federal-
state equilibrium should remain relatively stable even as political 
demands respecting governance continue to show up nationally. 
Part III.B discusses Delaware’s takeover problem.  Here 
Delaware dealt with incompatible demands: management wanted 
antitakeover legislation and threatened to exit the state, while the 
federal government threatened to intervene to protect takeovers.  
Delaware responded by sticking with the evolutionarily stable 
strategy and staring down the federal government.  It made the 
right political choice.  The 1980s federal preemptive threat lacked 
political credibility and would not have disrupted the state 
equilibrium in any event. 
Part III.C turns to Delaware in the era of shareholder 
capitalism.  Time has been on Delaware’s side.  The federal 
government has lost all interest in takeovers.  And, even as 
institutional shareholders remain dissatisfied with takeover 
defenses, their complaints register only in a narrow network.  
Ironically, their primary role at the state level has been to 
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strengthen Delaware’s position in the charter market.  Today, due to 
the activist institutions, the shareholder veto on reincorporations 
means more than in the past, making even less likely the emergence 
of a competing state marketing a more management-favorable 
product. 
Part III.D concludes by asking whether it is helpful to analogize 
Delaware to a federal administrative agency.  The discussion admits 
the power of the analogy, but questions whether it assists us at the 
bottom line, where the question goes to the strength to be accorded 
to the internal affairs presumption. 
A. Fiduciary Law 
Rent extraction, when visible, can come at the cost of 
diminished reputation.300  Cary imposed that cost on the Delaware 
courts when he accused them of monolithic support of management 
rent seeking, citing a cluster of cases as evidence.301  The Delaware 
courts proved sensitive to Cary’s allegations of corruption, 302 
becoming more noticeably responsive to the shareholder interest in 
the three decades since 1974.303  Most of the cases Cary cited are no 
longer good law.304 
 
 300. PERSSON & TABELLINI, supra note 78, at 18. 
 301. Cary, supra note 93, at 673-98. 
 302. Id. at 684, 696-98. 
 303. For empirical confirmation, see Douglas M. Branson, Indeterminacy: 
The Final Ingredient in an Interest Group Analysis of Corporate Law, 43 VAND. 
L. REV. 85, 104-08 (1990).  Branson’s study of Supreme Court cases decided 
between 1974 and 1987 finds a larger number of proshareholder results than 
promanagement results. 
 304. Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964), a mainstay of management 
takeover defensive practice, fell to Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 
A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985) (reversing Cheff and applying an expanded review 
of tender offer defensive tactics under proportionality test) and Revlon, Inc. v. 
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (inventing 
a duty of management defending tender offer to auction company in limited 
circumstances), during the takeover wars of the 1980s.  Graham v. Allis-
Chalmers Manufacturing Co., 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963), fell more recently, 
untenable in light of a generation of contrary management practice under the 
monitoring model of corporate governance.  See In re Caremark Int’l Derivative 
Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996).  A similar fate could be suggested for 
Getty Oil Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 267 A.2d 883, 887 (Del. 1970).  See E. Norman 
Veasey & William E. Manning, Codified Standard–Safe Harbor or Uncharted 
Reef? An Analysis of the Model Act Standard of Care Compared to Delaware 
Law, 35 BUS. LAW. 919, 929-30 (1980) (discussing Graham).  American 
Hardware Corp. v. Savage Arms Corp., 136 A.2d 690, 694 (Del. 1957) (refusing 
to enjoin a defensive shareholders meeting called on short notice or to act 
respecting a proxy statement the court acknowledged to be incomplete) might 
well come out differently today, given Unocal and other cases more closely 
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The break with the past first manifested itself in 1977, when 
Singer v. Magnavox Co.305 imposed strict fiduciary standards on 
parent firms in cash out mergers.  Singer is famous for having come 
down just after the Supreme Court removed the threat of federal 
preemption of state fiduciary rules under the antifraud rules of the 
securities laws.306  The story told at the time was that the brush with 
preemption at the hands of the federal judiciary and the critical 
atmosphere provoked by Cary, Nader, and others prompted the 
Delaware Supreme Court to reverse its direction so as to better 
accommodate the interests of investors and thereby diminish the 
possibility of future threats of intervention.  Indeed, around the time 
the case was decided in 1977, the SEC proposed a rule that required 
substantive fairness in the class of transactions covered by the 
case.307   Delaware’s defensive adjustment yielded results in the 
SEC’s rulemaking proceeding—the final rule promulgated two years 
later dropped the fairness test and limited its reach to disclosure.308  
Thus did a federal threat impress upon the Delaware courts the 
practical importance of solicitude to shareholder interests.309 
The post-Cary behavior pattern persisted as the courts 
articulated unexpected new shareholder-protective applications of 
 
scrutinizing management procedural manipulations and misrepresentations.  
See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 653-58 (Del. Ch. 1988); 
Zirn v. VLI Corp., 621 A.2d 773, 778 (Del. 1993) (confirming director duty of full 
disclosure of shareholders in connection with merger).  Two cases Cary cited, 
Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 11 A.2d 331, 339 (Del. 1940) (permitting 
firms to use charter amendments effected through common shareholder voting 
power to strip preferred stockholders of contract rights) and Hariton v. Arco 
Electronics Inc., 188 A.2d 123, 125 (Del. 1963) (extending the doctrine of 
independent legal significance to mergers and acquisitions), are still good law, 
but operate in a less relentlessly management-favorable context.  A good faith 
duty to preferred stockholders has been acknowledged.  See, e.g., HB Korenvaes 
Invs., L.P. v. Marriott Corp., Fed Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 97,728 (Del. Ch. 1993), 
and mergers are subject a more broad-ranging fiduciary scrutiny.  Only Sinclair 
Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 721 (Del. 1971) (leaving burden of proof on 
complaining minority shareholders), stands unqualified, and few today 
complain about it. 
 305. 380 A.2d 969, 980 (Del. 1977). 
 306. See supra text accompanying note 181.  The case was Santa Fe 
Industries v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479-80 (1977). 
 307. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 14185 (Nov. 17, 1977). 
 308. See Securities Act Release Nos. 6100, 6101 (Aug. 2 1979); Ralph C. 
Ferrara & Marc I. Steinberg, A Reappraisal of Santa Fe: Rule 10b-5 and the 
New Federalism, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 263, 272-73 n.49 (1980). 
 309. Note also that judicial reputations depend on comparisons with the 
performance of judges on other courts, state and federal.  Thus a critical 
atmosphere can arouse reputational concerns even with a less immediate 
federal threat. 
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basic fiduciary rules.  The most famous examples concerned 
takeovers—Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.310 and Revlon, Inc. v. 
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.311 which established a regime 
of fiduciary scrutiny of takeover defensive tactics.  Friendly mergers 
also came under scrutiny—Smith v. Van Gorkom312 and Cede & Co. 
v. Technicolor, Inc. 313  surprised everyone with surprisingly 
aggressive applications of the duty of care to board approvals of 
proposed mergers.  Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC 
Network Inc.314 later brought the takeover and the merger cases 
together with a broadly phrased directive to managers under hostile 
attack to enhance shareholder value.315 
But the pattern has been volatile.  Equally famous cases restrict 
the application of the new rules.  In fact, the Singer rule did not last 
long, being in turn rejected in 1983 for a looser, process-based 
approach to cashout mergers in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. 316  
Weinberger later was itself cut back, when short-form mergers were 
excepted from the category subject to fiduciary scrutiny.317  The 
promises of Unocal and Revlon also went unfulfilled.  Under Moran 
v. Household International, Inc.318 and its progeny, the poison pill 
remains a potent and largely unregulated defense.319  In the eyes of 
critical observers, Delaware’s cases amount to little more than a 
conjuring trick.  The courts garnered publicity in a handful of highly 
 
 310. 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985) (reversing Cheff and applying an 
expanded review of tender offer defensive tactics under the proportionality 
test). 
 311. 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (inventing a duty of management 
defending a tender offer to auction company in limited circumstances). 
 312. 488 A.2d 858, 873-81 (Del. 1985) (expanding the duty of care suddenly 
to cover board approval of arm’s length merger). 
 313. 634 A.2d 345, 366-71 (Del. 1993) (applying a heightened duty of care 
scrutiny of boardroom merger decision and suggesting an expanded remedial 
concept inclusive of post-merger gain). 
 314. 637 A.2d 34, 43 (Del. 1994) (holding that management has an obligation 
to achieve best value reasonably available for shareholders). 
 315. Less surprising but equally important is the recent invalidation of a 
delayed-redemption poison pill in Quickturn Design Systems, Inc. v. Shapiro, 
721 A.2d 1281, 1293 (Del. 1998). 
 316. 457 A.2d 701, 704, 715 (Del. 1983) (overruling Singer in favor of less 
restrictive process scrutiny of cash-out mergers). 
 317. See Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242, 244 (Del. 
2001). 
 318. 500 A.2d 1346, 1356-57 (Del. 1985) (sustaining poison pill defense 
under Unocal). 
 319. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150-54 
(Del. 1989), made this clear with its allowance of extraordinary latitude to 
managers defending a tender offer that disrupts preexisting plans for a friendly 
merger. 
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publicized cases, ruling against management and announcing vague 
standards that held out the prospect of shareholder value 
enhancement.  But in less well-publicized subsequent cases, they 
used the camouflage of complex facts to refrain from applying the 
standards in management-constraining ways.320   The full set of 
results tallied by the lawyers signaled considerably more room for 
managerial maneuvering than did the public profile signaled by the 
leading cases. 
Whatever the merits of the cases’ holdings, Delaware’s judges 
have transformed the state into a respectable lawmaker.  This 
partly results from the quality of the bench—even when ruling for 
management in cases of palpable shareholder injury, its analyses 
are thoughtful.  The bench’s awareness of its national role also 
figures in.  As judges, they have an independent reputational 
incentive to advocate for their system’s legitimacy.321  They now 
maintain a dialog on governance issues with the bar, financial 
intermediaries, and academics.322  Outsiders when Cary wrote, they 
are now important players in the elite governance policy network.  
They make a convincing case, explaining that they pursue the 
state’s interest in balancing conflicting interest group demands, 
acting in a meditative capacity.  They take care to point out that 
they not only mediate between management and shareholders, but 
as also protect market risk-taking even as they impose ethical 
constraints.323  It has become hard to imagine a bench that could do 
a better job, given the constraints imposed by the state 
equilibrium.324 
 
 320. For a reading of the cases after Unocal along these lines, see VICTOR 
BRUDNEY & WILLIAM W. BRATTON, BRUDNEY & CHIRELSTEIN’S CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON CORPORATE FINANCE 1087-95, 1129-30 (4th ed. 1993). 
 321. See Eric Rasmusen, Judicial Legitimacy as a Repeated Game, 10 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 63, 72-74, 78-80 (1994) (offering a repeat game model of judicial 
motivation showing that judges follow precedent if there is a self-enforcing 
system based the need to uphold systemic legitimacy); see also Thomas J. Miceli 
& Mertin M. Co gel, Reputation and Judicial Decision-making, 23 J. ECON. 
BEHAV. & ORG. 31, 44-49 (1994) (modeling the preferences of judges on a utility 
function that includes both a private and a reputational component). 
 322. See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Our Corporate Federalism and the 
Shape of Corporate Law 31 (New York University Law School, Working Paper 
No. 04-020, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=564685. 
 323. See Andrew G.T. Moore, II & Bayless Manning, State Competition: 
Panel Response, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 779, 779-800 (1987) (at the time Moore was 
a Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court).  They also have acknowledged the 
federal threat.  See William T. Quillen, The Federal-State Corporate Law 
Relationship—A Response to Professor Seligman’s Call for Federal Preemption 
of State Corporate Fiduciary Law, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 107, 129 (1993). 
 324. For a contrasting approbation of the Delaware courts, see Kahan & 
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Two facets of the case law demonstrate the astuteness and 
innovation that the Delaware bench brings to its mediations.  The 
first is the special committee of independent directors, which can be 
traced to a footnote in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.325  The predecessor 
case, Singer, had effected Delaware’s fiduciary about-face, 
employing substantive review directed to the fairness or unfairness 
of the corporate action taken, very much in the mode of the trust 
paradigm.  Weinberger dropped that approach to draw instead on 
the process-based governance agenda in scrutinizing transactions 
impacting the rights of minority shareholders.  The court held out 
relaxed scrutiny, provided that a committee of independent directors 
was constituted to negotiate on behalf of the minority.  It was a 
brilliant compromise: judicial scrutiny of the transaction still would 
be necessary, but scrutiny would extend only to the conduct of the 
constructed negotiation; this in turn obviated the need for direct, 
mandatory review of the transaction.  Process was better than 
substance for two reasons: first, it diminished the likelihood of 
judicial confrontation with the salient question of whether the 
majority was robbing the minority; second, it avoided confrontation 
with fact questions concerning the value of the firm.  Since 
Weinberger, the independent committee device has been widely 
drawn on in Delaware fiduciary cases.326  An additional, incidental 
benefit has appeared over time.  Issues about the composition of 
special committees and their conduct of proceedings bring the 
Delaware courts to the forefront of debates about corporate best 
practices and the governance agenda. 327   The Delaware bench 
emerges as a focal point in the self-regulatory discussion.  This is 
exactly the right strategy. 
The second salient aspect of Delaware’s cases is the habit of 
making normative pronouncements on a prospective basis and 
avoiding imposition of damages.  Delaware judges use their cases’ 
complex fact patterns to make moral pronouncements about 
management behavior.  The culpable manger is not, however, 
necessarily hit with an injunction against his or her deal; a money 
judgment is still less likely.328  Instead, the court announces its 
 
Rock, supra note 322, at 29 (comparing Delaware case law to nineteenth-
century jurisprudence and explaining that structural weakness causes 
Delaware cases to take on a neutral, technocratic gloss). 
 325. 457 A.2d 701, 709 n.7 (Del. 1983). 
 326. See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1116 (Del. 
1994). 
 327. See, e.g., In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 920 (Del. 
Ch. 2003) (expounding on the meaning of directorial independence). 
 328. Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate 
Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1015, 1039 (1997).  Although a money 
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dissatisfaction with the manager’s conduct in the course of denying 
an injunction against the transaction or dismissing the complaint.  
It is the actor in the next deal who replicates the disapproved 
conduct that faces a litigation risk.329  Edward Rock argues that this 
works well: Delaware judges communicate normative standards to 
the business community through a network of lawyers and 
investment bankers.  Significantly, the resulting behavioral 
deterrent is reputational rather than financial.330 
The Delaware courts learned to take this kid-gloves approach 
the hard way.  The Delaware Supreme Court’s innovative and 
aggressive application of the duty of care in Smith v. Van Gorkum 
did hold out an immediate prospect of a money judgment against 
independent directors. 331   The result was nervousness in 
boardrooms, a substantial increase in insurance premiums, and 
much criticism of Delaware.  The legislature had to intervene to 
undo the result of the strategic misfire.  Prompted by the corporate 
committee of the state bar, it amended Delaware’s code to permit 
firms to opt out of the duty of care by charter amendment.332  The 
courts would not make the same mistake again: we know of only one 
case in the two decades since Van Gorkum in which a Delaware 
court imposed a significant damage award on director defendants. 333 
With this prospective, dialogic approach, the Delaware courts 
break out of the conventional pattern of legislation and adjudication.  
In the conventional set up, only the legislature acts prospectively; 
common law is applied by judges on a present basis, even if the 
ruling is unprecedented.  The litigant who breaches an extant duty 
on a new fact pattern loses the case and pays a judgment or has its 
course of conduct enjoined.  From an abstract perspective, it is hard 
to see what makes corporate managers such delicate beings that 
they require an exemption from the ordinary rules of the game.  The 
point must be that the exemption has been purchased, and 
solicitude is expected within the state equilibrium.  The system 
appears to satisfy management, which is happy to pay attorneys to 
churn litigation that rarely entails more substantial costs in terms 
 
payment (probably in the form of a settlement) may follow where the injunction 
against the deal is denied but the complaint is not dismissed.  Id. at 1039. 
 329. Id. at 1023-39. 
 330. Id. at 1012-16. 
 331. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985). 
 332. DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8 § 102(b)(7) (2001) (permitting opting out of 
personal liability for directors for duty of care violations). 
 333. See In re Emerging Commc’n, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, No. Civ.A. 
16415, 2004 WL 1305745, at *38-40 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004) (holding outside but 
financially sophisticated director jointly and severally liable with the corporate 
principals for approving an unfair going private transaction). 
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of money judgments or lost deals.  Clearly the lawyers also are 
satisfied.  For the shareholders, the system remains problematic 
even in the era of shareholder capitalism. 
But it still is clearly superior to the pre-Cary system.  In the 
1970s, the Delaware courts decided that they would have to police in 
order to maintain the state’s credibility as a national lawmaking 
center.  Police they have, but in a unique fashion.  In the federal 
state context, they have become the good cop to the federal 
government’s bad cop.334  Delaware’s courts try to avoid falling into 
the conventional judicial role of enforcing positive law, even as the 
federal government’s role as compliance officer expands and extends 
deeper into state territory with mandates and prosecutions.  This 
distinguishes Delaware not only from the federal government, but 
also from the other states, the judges of which cannot be expected to 
play the game with such finesse. 
Summing up, the Delaware courts responded to the instability, 
criticism, and challenges of the 1970s with a new strategy that 
merged fiduciary review with the self-regulatory governance 
agenda.  To look only at the case holdings is to see an unstable body 
of law. 335  To look at the cases in the wider equilibrium context is to 
see a stable strategy.  The Delaware courts have learned that the 
salient part of the case can be the remedy rather than the holding.  
At the federal level, Delaware’s prominence as a governance and 
dispute resolution center diminish its vulnerability to attack.  With 
Delaware now holding a prestigious place within elite governance 
networks, federal agenda setters are unlikely to view it as a 
problem.  As its value increases in its customers’ eyes, Delaware will 
have more than adequate political support in Washington.  Thus did 
Congress except Delaware from the SLUSA in 1998.  The same did 
not follow with SOX.  But SOX addressed political demands that 
 
 334. The federal enforcement apparatus looms especially large in the context 
of state-federal comparison.  Whether the actual enforcement numbers 
impress—the SEC brings only 500 to 600 enforcement actions per year and 
settles the vast majority, see Langevoort, supra note 288, at 6-7—depends on 
the perspective of the observer; see also Bernard Black et al., Liability Risk for 
Outside Directors: A Cross-Border Analysis, 11 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 153 (2005) 
(surveying Australia, Canada, Britain, the United States, France, Germany, 
and Japan and showing that outside directors of public companies face only a 
tiny risk of liability). 
 335. It has been suggested that Delaware cases’ indeterminacy stems from 
strategic concerns and amounts to an abuse of the state’s dominant position in 
the charter market.  Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of 
Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1919, 1927-28, 1931, 
1935 (1998).  We are unpersuaded.  See William W. Bratton, Delaware Law as 
Applied Public Choice Theory: Bill Cary and the Basic Course After Twenty-Five 
Years, 34 GA. L. REV. 447, 469-72 (2000). 
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Delaware’s evolutionarily stable strategy makes it powerless to 
anticipate or confront.336  And, despite its entry into internal affairs, 
SOX in no way impairs the charter market or Delaware’s rent flows.  
A counterfactual suggestion arises.  Delaware’s new respectability 
assured that the Enron crisis worked itself out as a federal 
enforcement event.  No one suggested that state-level self-regulation 
bore responsibility.337  Indeed, Delaware judges have taken to voicing 
complaints about SOX and SEC governance initiatives in national 
venues, extolling the virtues of their good-cop system.338  If they had 
serious worries about federal intervention, they would not be 
entering these public dissents. 
B. Takeovers and the Federal Threat 
Now we backtrack to Delaware’s response to the instability 
precipitated by the takeover wars of the 1980s.  Six months after 
CTS, thirty-four other states had enacted antitakeover legislation.339  
Management was pressuring Delaware to do the same.340  However, 
 
 336. For a contrary view, see Renee M. Jones, Rethinking Corporate 
Federalism in the Era of Corporate Reform, 29 J. CORP. L. 625, 654-62 (2004).  
Professor Jones sees the Delaware courts making a belated, but still 
preemptive, response to SOX in recent cases.  We have no quarrels with her 
description of the operative judicial behavior pattern.  But, in our view, such 
decisions amount to small-scale interventions that impact on corporate practice 
in only marginal ways. 
 337. This point can be restated from an institutional perspective: federal-
state relations are a function of socially constructed roles and institutional 
roles; actors have mutable preferences that change due to socialization, 
learning or persuasion.  MARK A. POLLACK, THE ENGINES OF EUROPEAN 
INTEGRATION: DELEGATION, AGENCY, AND AGENDA SETTING IN THE EU 57-59 
(2003).  Institutions are points of communicative interaction among actors 
socialized within common norms.  They discover their preferences through 
processes of deliberation within these institutional frameworks.  Kathleen R. 
McNamara, Rational Fictions: Central Bank Independence and the Social Logic 
of Delegation, 25 W. EUR. POL. 47, 66 (2002).  Given deliberations about 
corporate governance and compliance in the wake of an external shock, 
Delaware’s new respectability makes it much less likely that actors at the 
federal level will change their inherited preferences respecting the federal-state 
allocation so as to disturb the state equilibrium. 
 338. See Former Del. Supreme Court Chief Justice: Federal Power Threatens 
Role of Del. Law, 36 BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1493 (2004) (describing a speech 
by Norman Veasey at the ABA annual meeting); SEC Official, Delaware Chief 
Justice Don’t See Eye-to-Eye on Federalism Issues, 36 BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. 
1478 (2004) (describing back and forth between Chief Justice Myron Steele and 
SEC Director of Corporation Finance Alan Beller at the ABA annual meeting). 
 339. See supra text accompanying notes 183-89. 
 340. See Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 625 
(2003) (noting that Martin Lipton was recommending reincorporation out of 
Delaware). 
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actors in the Reagan administration were pressuring Delaware not 
to do the same, threatening to preempt its takeover regulation if it 
did.341  Delaware finally enacted a weak statute.342  Commentators 
put contrasting glosses on these events.  One view emphasizes that 
Delaware’s weak response reflected shareholder-side demands 
unique to the national chartering state.  In other states the statutes 
followed from the influence of local firms: all potential targets.  
Delaware, in contrast, is home to bidders as well as targets, 343 and 
the countervailing capital market interest also registers there.344  
The other view emphasizes the federal threat.345  Under this view, 
the events of the era stand as an exemplar of constructive back and 
forth within the federation, with threatened federal intervention 
curbing Delaware’s structural preference for the management 
interest. 
Both perspectives figure into the overall picture.  But we 
emphasize a third aspect.  Under Delaware’s evolutionarily stable 
strategy, it sometimes has to make concessions to management in 
the teeth of opposition at the national level.  Even as Delaware 
enacted a weak statute on a slow timetable, it did enact a statute.  
Delaware thereby signaled its fidelity to the management interest 
and a determination to maintain state law’s equilibrium tilt to 
management.  The federal threat imported credibility to the signal, 
to the extent there really was a federal threat. 
But the Washington actors who tried to protect the hostile 
takeover in the 1980s lacked the political wherewithal to follow 
through.  As we have seen, the Congress was gridlocked on the 
subject.346  Moreover, even given congressional support for takeover 
protection, it is not at all clear that federal intervention would have 
disturbed the state equilibrium.  The takeover protection legislation, 
introduced in the House in 1987,347 would have given the SEC 
authority to promulgate rules prohibiting defensive tactics and to 
 
 341. Id. at 626-27 (noting that the White House Counsel of Economic 
Advisors opposed the Delaware statute, that an SEC Commissioner threatened 
to preempt, and that SEC Chair David Ruder said the same in a speech and 
also warned the statute’s drafter that enactment would be imprudent). 
 342. See DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8 § 203 (2001). 
 343. Romano, supra note 108, at 468. 
 344. Id. 
 345. Roe, supra note 340, at 629-30; see also Bebchuk, supra note 119, at 
1455; Cary, supra note 93, at 688-89; Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of 
Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1512 (1989).  Anecdotal evidence 
shows that Delaware lawmakers keep federal intervention in mind when they 
take politically sensitive steps.  See Curtis Alva, Delaware and the Market for 
Corporate Charters: History and Agency, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 885, 906-08 (1990). 
 346. See supra text accompanying note 189. 
 347. H.R. 2172, 100th Cong. (1st Sess. 1987). 
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create “standards for the fair conduct of contests for corporate 
control,” subject to a shareholder “opt in” privilege.348  The provision 
would have terminated Delaware’s takeover case law under Unocal 
and Revlon, but otherwise would have left things in place.  That 
result might even have benefited Delaware by removing the 
competitive threat posed by tighter antitakeover provisions enacted 
in other states. 
The greater threat already had passed, the threat posed in the 
1970s by the cases that would have federalized much of fiduciary 
law and the 1980 federal fiduciary standards bill.349  But the 1980 
bill ended the long series of federal chartering threats with more of 
a whimper than a shot across Delaware’s bow.  To look at the longer 
history is to see federal chartering as a reform initiative that fell 
lower and lower on legislative agendas as the twentieth century 
unfolded.  It lay at the top of the Taft administration’s agenda.350  It 
dropped to the second tier of the second Roosevelt administration’s 
agenda.351  By the 1970s, it remained alive only in the offices of a 
handful of Congress members.352  After 1980, it disappeared.  Even 
as actors in the Reagan administration threatened to preempt 
defensive tactics, they were committed to a cooperative federal-state 
equilibrium and had no truck with federal chartering.  By 2002 
popular demands completed the transformation of federal corporate 
politics.  Now shareholder value triggers political emergencies. 
None of this should be taken to deny the fact that Delaware’s 
agents are averse to any exercise of federal preemptive power.353  
Moreover, federal rumblings certainly affected their behavior in the 
mid-1970s and mid-1980s.  But, similar rumblings have not been 
heard since, even as Congress made a significant intervention in 
SOX.  But because the Enron crisis concerned compliance, the state 
equilibrium gave Delaware no room for maneuver.354 
Federal chartering does remain in John Kingdon’s bottom 
 
 348. Id. § 14.  The statute also imposed a one share one vote rule, id. § 3, 
prohibited greenmail, id. § 5; accorded shareholders access to the proxy 
statement to nominate directors, id. § 6; prohibited street sweeps, id. § 11, 
prohibited golden parachutes, id. § 12; and amended the Williams Act in 
numerous ways.  Id. §§ 4, 7-10, 13. 
 349. See supra text accompanying notes 173-190. 
 350. See Brabner-Smith, supra note 49, at 162-63. 
 351. See supra text accompanying note 155. 
 352. See supra text accompanying note 173. 
 353. See William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism 
of the American Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two 
Residents of One Small State, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 953, 953-60 (2003). 
 354. Congress in any event acted so quickly as to leave any window of 
opportunity closed. 
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drawer, ready to be revived if Delaware ever steps out of line.  A 
federal threat accordingly figures into Delaware’s strategy at a deep 
structural level.  To the extent it actively impacts Delaware’s play, it 
presumably imports risk aversion respecting any state law 
innovation that disrupts the equilibrium in management’s favor.  
This shows in the historical pattern.  The last time Delaware 
initiated sua sponte a legislative process designed to catch 
management’s eye by providing it new benefits was in the 1960s.355  
Significantly, deteriorating market share made Delaware feel 
compelled to act.  We also see such risk aversion in the historical 
pattern that ties legislative innovation to rising stock markets.  
Management-favorable innovation is less likely to raise eyebrows in 
prosperous conditions.  It follows that whatever the bottom is, 
Delaware will not go there, just as it will never tilt markedly in the 
shareholders favor.  Finally, note that barriers to entry into the 
charter market have imported stability since Delaware regained 
market share after 1967.  The barriers provide shareholders an 
incidental systemic benefit even as they block the analogy to a first-
best product market.  If entry were easy, the competitor could cater 
to management, enervating the fiduciary regime or otherwise 
curbing litigation. 
C. Delaware in the Era of Shareholder Capitalism 
The shareholder interest only nominally lost the takeover wars 
of the 1980s.  Although legal innovations during the 1980s made 
tender offers more expensive and less likely to occur, the normative 
agenda of the hostile offerors and their proponents in policy 
discussions did win the day.  The offerors demanded shareholder 
value maximization and the managers and state legislatures 
resisted.  In the 1990s, management did an about-face and 
assimilated the norm.356  Incentivized by stock options, managers 
began building their careers by maximizing value.  Disinvestment 
and conglomerate unbundling, which came by force in the 1980s, 
became an ordinary business agenda item.  At the same time, 
institutional shareholders, outraged by the antitakeover triumph of 
the 1980s, learned to ameliorate the shareholder collective action 
problem by organizing and making their voice heard in boardrooms 
and at the annual meetings.357  Performance pressures on executives 
 
 355. See supra note 65. 
 356. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1253, 1278-87 (1999). 
 357. Ironically, Delaware’s position is enhanced only because the primary 
avenue for shareholder intervention—the proxy rules—already has been 
federalized. 
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intensified.  So did conversations about items on the governance 
agenda, leading to apparent improvements in practice. 
Many question the depth of these changes now that the 
shareholder-value era has given way to the Enron era.  Whatever 
the quality of the change in the practice, there can be no question 
that the changes worked to Delaware’s advantage.  The diffusion of 
the shareholder-value norm and the shift of interest group influence 
toward a more even balance between management and an emerging 
class of shareholders,358 taken together, meant a better protected 
shareholder interest.  There resulted a lessening in intensity of the 
ongoing debate over the separation of ownership and control.  Where 
thirty years ago there prevailed a managerialist model of corporate 
governance that endorsed the delegation of substantial discretion to 
managers, 359  today the absolutist view represents a minority 
perspective. 360   The deflation of managerialism implies a 
concomitant diminution of antimanagerialism.  As a result, 
corporate governance debates have lost much of their ideological 
coloration and corporate federalism has become depoliticized.  
Today, debates tend to devolve on functional questions about value 
creation and agency costs, a context in which Delaware often comes 
up looking very good. 
The federal threat accordingly recedes further into the deep 
structure of corporate federalism.  The state-enabling regime still 
remains vulnerable to federal mandates, perhaps even more 
vulnerable.  Shareholder capitalism has brought the conduct of 
business and stock market results forward in the national 
consciousness, 361  making negative shocks politically salient in 
Washington.  Yet, despite the notable incursion on internal affairs 
in SOX, it holds out no apparent disruption of the state equilibrium.  
Delaware being a business, only a threat to the state equilibrium 
matters to its bottom line.  As to this, the federal government has 
proved surprisingly cooperative. 
Shareholder activism also helps Delaware by reducing the 
threat of potential competition.  Through much of the 1980s, it 
remained conceivable that Delaware could suffer a significant 
number of outbound reincorporations to the stronger antitakeover 
states.  To the extent shareholders rubber stamped shark-repellant 
 
 358. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 248, at 443. 
 359. See id. at 444. 
 360. Steve Bainbridge is the leading proponent.  See, e.g., Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers: Preliminary Reflections, 
55 STAN. L. REV. 791, 818 (2002); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The 
Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 605 (2003). 
 361. ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 71-95 (2000). 
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charter amendments, they also would rubber stamp a management-
protective reincorporation.  That assumption has not been safe for 
some time.362  Shareholders now vote no on such proposals. It follows 
that even as management retains agenda control over 
reincorporation, the shareholder veto has become meaningful.  The 
exit door from Delaware to a neocharter monger would certainly be 
sticky, and very well may be locked in most cases.363  And even if an 
exit-seeking management could get the votes, it still might 
hesitate—the reincorporation process might send a bad signal to the 
financial markets.  It follows that the only competitive threat to 
Delaware would come from a state that devised a superior strategy 
addressed to issues as to which management and shareholder 
interests stand aligned.  That seems an unlikely event, given 
Delaware’s ability to learn and modify its approach in response to 
changes in practice. 
The foregoing points, taken together, also imply increased slack 
for the Delaware courts respecting the ongoing mediation between 
the management and shareholder interests.  Widespread acceptance 
of the shareholder-value norm frees the Delaware bench to 
intervene for the shareholders with less worry about the result 
disrupting the equilibrium.  Such interventions have lost any public 
interest coloration.  In any event, the genius of Delaware lawmakers 
lies in their ability to generate a thick fiduciary law without at the 
same time imposing a significant compliance burden. 
Hostile takeovers are the sticking point in this description.  
Delaware remains an antitakeover state, with its poison pills, 
classified boards, and cooperative judiciary more than making up for 
the weakness of its antitakeover statute.  Its continued adherence to 
the management side and rejection of short-term value 
maximization continues to occupy a top spot on the agendas of 
shareholder activists and academic commentators.364 
But this appears to be another case of a narrow, elite political 
network fighting a rearguard action against a stable equilibrium.  
 
 362. Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize Value, 
17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83, 87-88 (2001). 
 363. Here we note that a negative inference arises from Lucian Bebchuk et 
al., Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate Law?, 90 CAL. L. 
REV. 1775, 1783 (2002), which surveys reincorporation activity to find that 
competition does tend to reward the antitakeover states.  But see Subramanian, 
supra note 297, at 1843-44 (finding recapture antitakeover statutes and 
mandatory classified boards have hurt the ability of adopting states to retain 
companies). 
 364. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force 
of Staggered Boards, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 950 (2002) (promoting effective 
staggered boards as the most powerful antitakeover device). 
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Takeovers have disappeared from the federal political agenda.  
Between 1987 and 1990, thirty-two bills concerning hostile 
takeovers and defensive tactics were introduced in the Congress.365  
Between 1991 and 1994, there were seven such bills, and after 1994, 
only one.366  With the Congress quiescent, the states’ antitakeover 
equilibrium stays in place.  This political result is easily explained.  
Takeover protection never had much political traction in 
Washington, due to management opposition and public indifference 
or hostility.367  The newly vocal shareholder interest apparently still 
makes for an insufficient counter.  Nor is it clear that it would make 
sense for the lead institutions to direct their political energies to 
takeovers.  Other governance matters, like committee practice and 
access to the proxy statement, take precedence today. 
Other structural factors also can be cited.  Federal intervention 
in internal affairs tends to follow stock market reverses, because 
losses trigger political demands.  Merger and acquisition activity, 
including hostile offers, tends to coincide with rising stock 
markets, 368  a time when the management interest registers 
especially effectively.  Red ink may speak more loudly than 
opportunity costs in any event.  While the 1990s did yield clear-cut 
cases of opportunity costs to shareholders due to tough management 
defensive play,369 the cases were sporadic.  The prevailing picture 
was one of free-flowing premiums incident to friendly deals. 370  
Hostile takeovers were politically salient during the 1980s, when 
they provided the shareholder interest a stick to yield against 
suboptimal earnings-retention practices and conglomerate 
structures.371  By the 1990s, norms and incentive structures had 
shifted.  Managers in industries experiencing external shocks 
voluntarily responded by entering into restructuring transactions 
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 367. See Romano, supra note 109, at 490-503. 
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 369. Bebchuk et al., supra note 364, at 919-25. 
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D. Delaware as a National Agency 
Several commentators,372 including us,373 have suggested that 
corporate federalism be understood by analogy to the relationship 
between the legislature and an administrative agency.  This 
delegation analogy has attractive aspects.  The spread of Delaware 
charters nationwide makes Delaware a de facto national lawmaker.  
As such it serves a harmonization function in the national 
marketplace.  It also can be noted that Delaware owes its national 
impact to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Constitution to 
require states to admit firms chartered elsewhere, and accordingly 
collects rents only as a result of a federal dispensation of grace.  The 
Congress has the authority to federalize the subject matter in any 
event.  It follows that even though the Congress never formally 
delegated lawmaking authority to Delaware, it fairly may be viewed 
as an arm of the national government.  Arguably, to the extent the 
analogy succeeds, the federal allocation is justified and with it 
Delaware’s national role.  We think that the analogy is descriptively 
robust, but that it has limited justificatory impact for federalism 
discussions. 
Political theorists posit a menu of functions that agencies serve 
for legislative principals.  Two stand out as candidates for describing 
Delaware.  The first is substantive credibility.  Sometimes the 
legislature cannot credibly commit to stick to policy choices, due to 
the vagaries of elective politics and constituent demands.374  The 
legislature delegates to an agent that can establish the desired 
credible commitment and develop the necessary expertise.  The 
more insulated the agency from external political pressures the 
better it serves this function.  The delegation of monetary policy to a 
central bank is the classic case.375  Extending the point to Delaware, 
 
 372. See Macey, supra note 196, 267-68 (using the agency analogy as the 
basis for a public choice explanation of the existence of state regulation); Mark 
J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2493, 2530-36 (2005) (comparing 
Delaware to a central bank and noting limitations on the analogy). 
 373. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 122, at 1867-72 (drawing on 
agency literature to suggest self-regulatory strategies). 
 374. See POLLACK, supra note 337, at 23-24.  The legislature may want the 
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Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative 
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Fiduciary Relations in EU Governance, 2 EUR. UNION POL. 103, 110-11 (2001) 
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we see a need for a credible commitment from government in order 
to induce investment and can identify just that credible commitment 
in Delaware’s evolutionarily stable strategy. 
Does the analogy, thus drawn, carry through to import 
presumptive immunity from federal interference in internal affairs?  
We do not think so.  The central bank analogy is descriptively 
problematic because the delegation’s objective is the vesting of 
political property rights in the agency.376  Delaware has no such 
rights and has steadily seen its regulatory turf contained.  Worse, 
we can go to back to the credibility concept and apply it to the SEC: 
the SEC vests a voice for the shareholders and insulates the 
mandatory disclosure system from compromise due to management 
influence, importing credibility for the purpose of encouraging 
investment.  That the SEC was created in order to correct state-level 
results bespeaks a state-level adverse selection problem. 
At this point, the analogy’s proponent can fall back a step and 
restate the point, addressing the system as modified by the federal 
securities laws.  Like all principal-agent relationships, those 
between legislatures and agencies implicate agency costs, and ex 
post legislative overruling is a standard disciplinary device. 377  
Congress did just this in enacting the securities laws.  To the extent 
that Delaware is easily overruled and a threat of additional 
incursions imposes ongoing discipline in Delaware,378 the agency 
analogy holds well.379  It thereby comes to bear against those who 
argue for total preemption.  But, politically speaking, that argument 
 
(discussing Kenneth Rogoff’s theory that governments tend to delegate 
“monetary policy to a central banker who is more ‘conservative’ (i.e., more 
inflation averse) than the government” and commenting on the high level of 
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Intermediate Monetary Target, 100 Q. J. ECON. 1169, passim (1985). 
 376. Majone, supra note 375, at 114. 
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 378. See Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or 
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Delaware delegation fails in some instances. 
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has fallen off the agenda.  Today’s federalism discussion concerns 
the magnitude of the presumption against nonintervention.  At this 
point, the agency analogy works against charter market advocates 
who argue for a strong restraint against federal incursions into 
internal affairs.  Delegation analysis legitimizes such federal 
incursions on the ground that the principal’s preferences should 
prevail.  We are left to judge the federal intervention in cost-benefit 
terms, with no special presumption skewing the analysis, at least so 
long as the intervention does not disrupt the state-level 
equilibrium,380 a result that federal authorities do not appear to 
prefer. 
Now, let us try a second line of political theory.  Under this 
scenario, the agency serves a function analogous to that of a 
congressional committee:381 it sets the agenda, avoiding cycling, and 
perhaps also skewing the agenda in a desired direction.382  Mark Roe 
draws this analogy forcefully, pointing out that the delegation to 
Delaware orders the agenda and limits the players to the 
management and shareholder interests, relegating public interest 
advocates to secondary influence at the federal level.383  This too is 
descriptively accurate.  But its justificatory impact on the federalism 
discussion is similarly narrow.  It provides an argument against 
total preemption, but it does not, for example, support an argument 
against federal intervention to preempt antitakeover legislation or 
invalidate corporate defensive devices.  We also would add a 
historical caveat.  The description works better and better as one 
goes back in time, and federal chartering motivated by a public 
interest agenda becomes an active agenda item under the trust 
paradigm.  As one moves forward in time, the overall federal 
regulatory scheme more and more instantiates the strategy of 
contract and outside regulation for outside constituents and the 
public interest, with federal corporate law politics becoming more 
shareholder-value oriented.  To the extent federal corporate politics 
focuses only on the governance agenda, and it has been thus focused 
for twenty-five years, the structural importance of agenda control at 
the state level matters less and less for shareholder capitalism. 
 
 380. At this point the proponent of state discretion can argue that Delaware 
should be insulated as if it were a central bank.  But now the description has 
failed and the point merely restates the normative claim made in the federalism 
discussion. 
 381. See D. RODERICK KIEWIET & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE LOGIC OF 
DELEGATION: CONGRESSIONAL PARTIES AND THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS 22-25 
(1991). 
 382. POLLACK, supra note 337, at 25. 
 383. Roe, supra note 372, at 2504-19. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Federal intervention that interferes with the state equilibrium 
could be justified if done for the purpose of encouraging keener 
charter competition and a more even-handed strategic balance 
between the shareholder and management interests.  But we 
perceive no political incentives that might encourage federal 
micromanagement of the charter market.  Failing that, corporate 
federalism remains robust, so long as the federal government and 
stock exchanges continue to refrain from allocating to themselves so 
much subject matter as to cause Delaware’s customers to question 
the efficacy of their rent payments.  Those who would prefer to see 
no further expansion of federal territory are likely to be frustrated.  
The shareholder class having risen, corporate law is hardwired into 
national politics.  Only two developments could change the pattern: 
either managers assimilate a strong norm of financial truth-telling 
and compliance with law, or shareholders assimilate the precepts of 
fundamental value investment.  We predict no change. 
Meanwhile, Delaware is safe in the present context.  It would 
take a dramatic shift in federal policy preferences to threaten it.  
Such a development seems unlikely.  We have seen striking changes 
in political preferences since 1888, yet these have given rise to few, 
if any, serious attempts to transfer corporate lawmaking in whole to 
the federal government.  Positive political economy suggests that 
once an institutional structure has run in one direction for a long 
period, one is unlikely to see new constraints that alter the original 
understanding.384 
 
 384. See supra note 198 and accompanying text. 
